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Introduction 
Beginning in the late 1980s and continuing until the mid-2000s, the economy of 
Ireland (i.e., of the 26-county Republic) grew so rapidly and even exuberantly that its 
admirers coined the term, “the Celtic Tiger,” to denote its apparent similarity to the then-
booming “Tiger economies” of southeast Asia.  Now a bitter memory, the Celtic Tiger 
phenomenon has become a field of research closely examined by historians and 
economists alike.  The disintegration of the Celtic Tiger, once proclaimed a model for 
global emulation, has forced scholars to excavate both its merits and inadequacies.  
Sadly, it has become evident that the model’s flaws were more significant than its 
strengths. 
To better understand the circumstances surrounding the recent boom and bust of 
the Irish economy, exploring its foundations and catalysts is essential.  The Celtic Tiger 
was not a sensation that simply occurred out of thin air.  Rather, it was the culmination of 
consciously guided policy-making at a domestic level, as well as a consequence of 
macro-level developments in the global financial and economic system. 
This summation may be criticized by a variety of scholars, as many of those who 
have explored the development of the Irish economy have tried to situate its growth 
within two competing theoretical frameworks.  The first of these frameworks 
conceptually lies within delayed-convergence theory.  Essentially, this structural analysis 
asserts that Ireland simply “caught up” to economic standards experienced by other 
industrialized economies, resulting in a period where economic performance was greater 
in Ireland due to rapid development.  However, this is not to say that proponents of 
delayed-convergence theory suggest that this process happened without impetus.  Instead, 
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they view policy-making as the primary catalyst behind economic growth, in terms both 
of spurring progress through policy incentives and of removing barriers and obstacles that 
previously obstructed economic development. Unfortunately, delayed-convergence 
theorists largely devalue the relevance of external forces in shaping both the development 
and character of the Irish economy.  This fault cannot be ignored, due to Ireland’s 
dependent economic status dating back to (and before) Independence. 
However, where delayed-convergence theory falters, the competing framework of 
Ireland as part of a regional boom begins to materialize.  Advocates of this scope of 
analysis argue that, “Ireland’s small size means that it should be treated as a region of a 
larger entity,”1 and furthermore it “implies that the key cause of growth is the 
performance of those industries in Ireland’s export base.”  As will be seen, this is very 
much evident in the Irish model, as the economy turned from looking inward through 
import-substitution and indigenous development, toward policies that advocated export-
oriented growth through attraction of foreign direct investment (FDI) from multi-national 
corporations (MNCs). 
It should also be stated that this regional boom hypothesis carries with it the 
implications that because small size economies are part of a larger economic sphere, their 
vulnerability to booms and busts within these larger systems is much higher.  Once again, 
this was very much the case in Ireland, both during the period of the Celtic Tiger and 
during the economic malaise of the 1970s - an era largely overlooked in Irish economic 
1 Eoin O’Leary, “Reflecting on the ‘Celtic Tiger’: before, during, and after,” Irish Economic and Social 
History, Vol. 38 (2010): 81. 
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history.  Concurrently, this framework suggests that in this structure, “industry is more 
specialised than diversified, so that shocks affecting it have larger effects.”2 
Basically what this debate boils down to is whether the performance of the Irish 
economy was the result of proactive policy-making (delayed-convergence) or a reaction 
to external forces.  What I argue is that Irish economic performance during the latter half 
of the twentieth century, can be characterized as being proactive in regards to domestic 
economic policy as a reaction to global economic conditions.  Obviously this could be 
viewed as a way to circumvent this debate, but I contest otherwise.  Each of these 
frameworks contains inadequacies in its analysis that can be corrected by its counterpart.  
It is indisputable that the external forces of globalization and economic integration 
compelled Irish policymakers to adopt a more outward-looking approach to economic 
policy formation and development. 
The other issue to examine here is when and how did these transformations occur.  
Historians and economists alike have regarded these processes as having commenced 
with the ascension of Seán Lemass to Taoiseach in 1959.  This period in history is widely 
considered a watershed in Irish society, as political and economic institutions began to 
drift away from adherence to nationalist ideals promoted by Eamon de Valera during his 
more than twenty years in power.  In contrast, Lemass steered Ireland toward a more 
outward looking approach, specifically in economic policy, to conform to international 
developments that began to escalate in the postwar period. 
As will be explored, the Lemass Era created an economic model subsequent 
governments followed and expanded upon.  As large-scale circumstances changed within 
2 O’Leary, “Reflecting on the Celtic Tiger,” 81. 
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both Europe and the broader Western economic sphere, Irish policymakers steered 
toward favorably situating the Irish economy within these structures.  The primary 
avenue through which this was done was attracting foreign investment to Ireland.  
Throughout the latter decades of the twentieth century, the direction and image of the 
Irish economy were molded in the attempt to draw foreign capital to the domestic market, 
due largely to the historical lack of indigenous industrial development.  This economic 
platform was implemented through a variety of different policy mechanisms, including 
favorable corporate taxation, transfer pricing, the appearance of tranquil labor relations, 
and a supply of relatively cheap labor.  These and other devices worked in conjunction to 
create an “MNC-reliant strategy” that grew the economy in terms of its gross output, but 
largely failed to develop any semblance of a sufficient indigenous economic base. 
An important issue to mention regarding Ireland’s economic performance during 
this period is how to adequately measure Irish economic growth. As previously noted, the 
period under analysis was distinguished by massive influxes of foreign capital.  In turn, 
many of the profits accumulated by foreign investment were repatriated through various 
schemes and taken out of the Irish economy.  Thus, it is important that we measure Irish 
economic performance through measurements of gross national product (GNP), as 
opposed to gross domestic product (GDP).  As an example of the disparity between these 
two performance gauges, in 1999 Irish GNP was only 85% of the country’s entire GDP. 
Before discussing and analyzing the origins of Ireland’s recent economic boom, it 
is necessary to define the term “the Celtic Tiger.”  Beginning in the early 1990s, the Irish 
economy began to grow at a rate not previously experienced.  This period of 
uninterrupted growth continued from 1994 until early 2008.  Many economists and 
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historians divide the Celtic Tiger into two separate eras.  The first of these periods was 
dominated by an influx of FDI from numerous MNCs, mainly from the United States.  
These corporations generated an economy based on high-tech production and an 
emerging services sector, while also enjoying a friendly business environment based on 
favorable corporate tax rates.  However, after the dot-com bubble of the early 2000s, 
many of the high-tech corporations that located to Ireland in the 1990s left the country as 
economic conditions compelled them to reduce costs in human and financial capital. 
 In order to fill the hole left by a reduction in MNC investment in the economy, the 
Irish government sought to stimulate economic activity by prompting investment in the 
Irish property market.  Working with Ireland’s banks and property developers, the 
government created a growing property market that increased employment numbers in 
the construction sector, while also fulfilling demand for investment in the property 
market.  However, this property boom eventually transformed into a property bubble that 
was based on over-speculation by the banks and overdevelopment by property 
developers.  As the global financial system began to crumble in 2007 and 2008, the Irish 
property market collapsed as credit markets began to freeze, creating a liquidity crisis in 
the Irish banking system.  The mounting costs of this financial crisis forced the 
government to step in and guarantee liquidity in the banks.  This would eventually 
bankrupt the Irish government and drive the economy into depression.  By the end of 
2008, the Celtic Tiger was dead. 
 Another important term to define to understand Ireland’s recent economic 
development is modernization.  The economic growth theory of W.W. Rostow is most 
applicable in describing Ireland’s economic modernization.  Rostow’s growth theory 
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proposes that historically, economies undergo five different stages in development.  
Formulated in the post-World War II period, Rostow’s framework sought to create a 
model that revered Western capitalist ideals.  This model’s purpose was to present an 
economic standard which small emerging economies could follow in order to achieve the 
economic prosperity that had already been attained by the “modernized” economies of 
the Western economic sphere, namely that of the United States.   The first of Rostow’s 
stages of growth pertains to the traditional society in which science and technology are 
largely neglected.  Rostow argues that a ceiling in productive capacities in the traditional 
society results “from the fact that the potentialities which flow from modern science and 
technology were either not available or not regularly and systematically applied.”3  The 
second stage of growth is made up of an era of transition in which societies embrace 
developments in science and technology that allow economies to grow their productive 
capacity. 
 The third of these stages, labeled by Rostow as “the take-off,” marks the “great 
watershed in the life of modern societies.”4 During this stage, previous barriers to 
extensive growth and production are overcome, and new techniques in economic 
development “come to dominate the society.”  Additionally, investment in the economy 
rises as more wealth is created by a seemingly unlimited production capacity.  The fourth 
and fifth of Rostow’s stages of economic development pertain the most to Ireland’s 
recent economic development.  The fourth stage concerns an economy’s maturation, as it 
gradually evolves from an industrial society into a more complex and technologically-
                                                        
3 W.W. Rostow. The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto (London: Cambridge 
University Press, 1960), 4. 
4 Rostow. The Stages of Economic Growth, 7. 
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based economy.  Rostow argues that, “This is the stage in which an economy 
demonstrates that it has the technological and entrepreneurial skills to produce not 
everything, but anything that it chooses to produce.”5 Eventually, this process of 
maturation transitions into a new stage based primarily on mass consumption.  
Furthermore, Rostow argues that this stage in economic development provides the 
foundation for the emergence of the welfare state and the modern age of consumerism.6 
 Rostow’s theory is somewhat broad and ambiguous as to when and how 
economies move from one stage to the next, but it provides economists and historians 
with a basic framework through which to interpret and analyze economic growth.  
However Rostow’s argument, while at points mentioning sectoral distribution in the 
economy, underemphasizes the necessity of economic diversification in ensuring growth 
and development.  In the case of the Irish economy, a lack of sufficient diversification 
contributed to an economic system that at certain times was forced to develop at rates the 
economy could not adequately sustain. 
 Though economic history can at times be tedious and dull, it gives scholars of 
various interests a foundation to construct upon.  Modern politics and society are so 
ingrained with economic rhetoric and thought that it is almost impossible to analyze 
either without some incorporation of an economic perspective.  However, economic 
history can be constricted by the fact that it is confined to certain metrics of analysis that 
are somewhat incontestable.   But what can be considered confining could actually be 
viewed as liberating, as continuous development in economic thought and interpretation 
                                                        
5 Rostow. The Stages of Economic Growth, 10. 
6 Rostow. The Stages of Economic Growth, 11. 
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allows for economic history to be constantly reevaluated.  This topic is one example of 
such reevaluation. 
 The constant reinterpretation and expansion of modes of analysis prove that 
economics is not a science.  It is instead a branch of scholarship in which there are no 
proven laws. Previously advanced theories rest solely upon the idea that humans will act 
rationally in economic relations and considerations.  As seen throughout modern history, 
this idea cannot be considered accurate. 
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I. An Economic Background: Independence to the 1950s 
In 1922, with the realization of Irish independence, one would expect that the 
Irish political elite would steer Ireland toward a more autonomous outlook in regards to 
politics and economics.  However, in the first few years after Independence, neither of 
these two processes occurred.  The subsequent Irish Civil War disrupted the social and 
economic development that many thought would come after independence was secured.  
The formation of pro-Treaty oriented Cumann na Gaedheal (CnG) in 1923, independent 
Ireland’s first governing party in the Dáil, ensured that an era of “caution and continuity” 
would be Ireland’s first experience as an independent nation.7 
 Until 1927, Cumann na Gaedheal’s hold over the Dáil continued unimpeded.  A 
general lack of indigenous industrial development, as well as the proclivity to maintain 
rural Ireland’s historical agricultural export base in Britain, was at the forefront of CnG’s 
economic agenda.  Coupled with a cautious fiscal policy, which did little to aid 
development from within, this platform resulted in a period that secured Ireland’s 
economic dependence on Great Britain. 
 It was not until 1927 that CnG encountered any semblance of political opposition.  
This was the point at which Eamon De Valera (colloquially referred to as “Dev”) and his 
Fianna Fáil party took their seats in the Dáil and began to participate within the formal 
Irish political structure.  As unemployment began to steadily rise, CnG’s brand of 
conservatism lost favor with the Irish public.  The perfect substitute to fill this political 
vacuum was Fianna Fáil, and in particular, De Valera himself.   
                                                        
7 Cormac Ó Gráda, A Rocky Road: The Irish Economy Since the 1920s (Manchester: Manchester 
University Press, 1997), 4. 
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 As an ardent republican, De Valera’s vision of an Irish Ireland appealed to voters 
across the social spectrum. His trademark populism attracted rural small farmers and 
urban workers alike, and he was able to consolidate the support of these two important 
social groups through his own vision of economic nationalism.  In 1932, Fianna Fáil took 
over control of the Dáil, and De Valera assumed the Presidency of the Executive Council. 
 The economic platform De Valera quickly enacted upon his ascension to power 
consisted primarily of two key policy mechanisms.  The first of these was aimed at Irish 
farmers.  As opposed to CnG’s agricultural policy, which proposed specialization in 
livestock and dairy production (aimed for export to Britain), De Valera sought to move 
the agricultural sector away from grazing in favor of tillage.  This would shift the power 
balance toward small farmers and landless laborers, and away from the large graziers 
who had previously dominated the agricultural sector.8 
 De Valera’s policy toward industrial development, however, is more important to 
understanding Ireland’s economic development during its early years.  Fianna Fáil sought 
to impose its brand of economic nationalism on industry primarily through its broader 
policy of import-substitution.  Through this broad mechanism, indigenous manufacturing 
would be developed to a point that would ensure industrial output would be sufficient to 
supply the domestic market, thus ensuring some semblance of industrial self-sufficiency.  
In addition to import tariffs and export quotas (the norm across Europe during this time), 
policy enacted at the national level would aid in the development of a manufacturing base 
through the creation of both public and private factories. 
                                                        
8 Ó Gráda, A Rocky Road, 5. 
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 Though Dev was the broad overseer of the implementation of this economic and 
political program, his right-hand man throughout this time, especially in regard to 
economic policy, was Seán Lemass.  As Minister of Industry and Commerce, Lemass 
was the main architect of Ireland’s industrial development throughout the 1930s.  He 
consolidated control over economic affairs within his department, and emerged as De 
Valera’s ablest associate in both economics and politics. 
 The primary avenue by which Lemass’ Department of Industry and Commerce 
pursued its developmental strategy was the institution of the Control of Manufacturers 
Acts, formulated between 1932 and 1934. These policy mechanisms were very much in 
line with De Valera’s emphasis on economic nationalism, as they sought to control 
industrial development through various modes.  The first of these was to ensure that new 
industrial endeavors would be financially backed by native investment, meaning that a 
majority of shareholders in a new company would be Irish citizens.  Industry and 
Commerce was able to control this process through its issuance of licenses to new 
entrants into the industrial sector.  The intent behind this was twofold.  Not only did this 
ensure that Irish industrial development would be developed by predominantly Irish 
investors, but it would also reduce the predominance of British finance within the Irish 
economy.  However, various historians have noted that this ideological motive was 
subsumed by the necessity of development within the broader European economy.  At 
various points, the structures of the Controls of Manufacturers Acts were bent to 
accommodate investment from foreign sources.9 
                                                        
9 Andy Bielenberg and Raymond Ryan, An Economic History of Ireland Since Independence (New York: 
Routledge, 2013), 13-14. 
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With the onset of the Great Depression, countries in Europe (and throughout the 
Western economic sphere) sought to protect themselves from vulnerability. The primary 
way governments did this was through tariff protection.  It should be noted that Ireland’s 
use of tariffs and quotas, as well as its broader policy of self-sufficiency, were not born 
out of a response to the Depression, but rather because of De Valera’s nationalist 
program, being implemented by Seán Lemass and the Department of Industry and 
Commerce.  Various measurements provided by Brian Girvin show that tariff protection 
instituted during this period led to increased employment in almost every industrial 
sector, except for umbrella making (which decreased by a total of five workers).  
Between the time when tariffs were first put in place and the outbreak of war in 1939, 
employment in the food, drink, and tobacco industry grew by seventy percent, while 
employment in the textile industries doubled.  On an even more remarkable level, 
employment in the apparel industry grew by 1000 percent, from 2,038 workers when 
tariffs were first put in place, to 21,820 workers in 1939.10 
 With the benefits of protectionism evident, Lemass sought to move toward the 
second phase of his plan to increase Ireland’s self-sufficiency.  As a way to ease some of 
the costs of the import-substitution strategy, Lemass looked to promote the domestic 
production of raw and semi-manufactured goods, which had predominantly been 
imported previously.  This would have benefited Ireland’s economy by creating new 
manufacturing opportunities in the production of unenumerated goods, as well as 
allowing for an expansion of the self-sufficiency model.  However, this expansion was 
                                                        
10 Brian Girvin, Between Two Worlds: Politics and Economy in Independent Ireland (Savage, MD: Barnes 
and Noble Books, 1989), 107. 
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prevented by the advent of World War II.  The ensuing “Emergency” greatly inhibited 
further Irish industrial development.   
 Historians such as Cormac Ó Gráda surmise that, during World War II, “the 
economy was virtually closed off from world markets.”11 This summation can be 
misleading though, as it is undetermined who in fact did the “closing off.”  It is natural 
that warring countries, Britain in particular, would close off foreign trade to markets they 
deemed to be not worth trading with, in order to increase economic vitality during a 
period in which production and investment was crucial to the war effort.  Ireland was a 
victim of this process. 
 In the face of an unfavorable international economic situation, Irish policymakers 
essentially had to make do with what they had.  To deal with the Emergency, De Valera 
appointed Seán Lemass as Minister of Supplies to institute regulation on consumption 
across a wide array of areas.  For instance, the use of private cars was limited to only 
doctors and clergymen during the period.  Furthermore, the government imposed a 
stalemate on wages. Not only did this inhibit bargaining power for workers, but it also 
had an adverse effect on consumer demand.  In addition, the bargaining power of labor 
was destroyed due to the implementation of a prohibition of labor strikes that sought the 
increase of wages.12 
 Though these drastic measures were undoubtedly detrimental to the Irish 
economy, policymakers were left with no alternative in the face of European 
circumstances.  Much as in other European countries, state intervention increased 
dramatically during the war.  Limits on consumption were instituted across the board.  
                                                        
11 Ó Gráda, A Rocky Road, 16. 
12 Ó Gráda, A Rocky Road, 17. 
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Fuel conservation was key to sustainability, as was rationing of various foodstuffs. As 
countries around the world were curtailing the export of raw materials and supplies in 
order to produce for the war effort, countries that were reliant on the importation of these 
goods suffered materially.  By all measures, living standards in Ireland fell during this 
period.  It is evident from the Irish experience during this period that although self-
sufficiency and autarky were thought to alleviate vulnerability to foreign markets, Ireland 
had not yet achieved the full realization of either of these objectives. 
 What is interesting to note during this period, is that historians have found an area 
in which Ireland continued exportation: its people.  Between 1939 and 1945, almost 
200,000 travel permits were issued to Irish citizens, roughly one-third to females and the 
remainder to males.  The outflow of people was the result of the historic push-pull 
dichotomy that appeared once again with the onset of WWII.  Naturally, British demand 
for labor was very high during this period.  Apart from this increase in demand, the 
attraction of Irish workers to the British market was further encouraged by stagnant 
development in the home market.  Furthermore, the wage gap between the two nations 
accelerated during the war.  As Ireland’s wages remained static, real wages in Britain 
increased by 20 percent during the same period.13 
 After the conclusion of WWII, patterns in consumption reversed dramatically, as 
the Irish people looked to “make up for loss time.”  “Personal expenditure rose by almost 
a quarter between 1945 and 1950.”14 Almost every sector of the Irish economy was 
propelled by this rise in consumer spending.  But more important than the rise in money 
flows, the postwar period also resulted in independent Ireland’s first significant 
                                                        
13 Ó Gráda, A Rocky Road, 18. 
14 Ó Gráda, A Rocky Road, 22. 
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experience in economic relations with the United States.  Prior to the war, American 
imports only accounted for roughly 5 percent of total imports, but afterwards this rate 
rose to 13 percent.  Additionally, Marshall Plan funding supplied the Irish treasury with 
nearly half of its governmental investment from 1949 through 1952.  Though the Irish 
experience under the Marshall Plan was not as dramatic as those of other European 
countries (such as Britain and Germany), this process laid the foundation for the prospect 
of furthering economic relations in the future.15 
 But whatever rebound Ireland experienced in the immediate postwar period was 
swiftly subdued by the economic and social depression of the 1950s. Economic 
innovation in the form of protectionism, which had produced substantial gains during the 
1930s, was neglected in the 1950s due to “the era of good feelings” created by the 
postwar boom in consumption.  Furthermore, Girvin argues that political instability 
during the 1950s worked to disguise continuity in economic policy during this period.  
This is evident in the fact that between 1948 and 1957, each incumbent government 
failed to win reelection.16  This continuity, described by Girvin, was grounded in the fact 
that economic management was “being utilized to preserve stability rather than generate a 
modern industrial economy.”17 The import-substitution strategy up to this point had 
allowed indigenous producers to cater solely to the domestic market, which produced 
growth in employment and production as evidenced by the experience of the 1930s. In 
the late 1940s and 1950s however, the Irish government imposed deflationary measures 
to combat a balance of payments crisis.  Both direct and indirect taxes were increased, 
                                                        
15 Bielenberg and Ryan, An Economic History, 17-18. 
16 Girvin, Between Two Worlds, 169. 
17 Girvin, Between Two Worlds, 171. 
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which once again limited consumer spending.18  As a response to the growing crisis, 
Fianna Fáil, was voted out of power in 1954, and the second inter-party government, led 
by Fine Gael, took control over the state’s political and economic apparatus.  However, 
this produced little change as policy continued to focus on alleviating Ireland’s balance of 
payments situation, while neglecting domestic economic stimulation.  To combat the 
economic malaise of the 1950s, the Irish citizenry resorted to its historical avenue 
through which to escape economic vulnerability: emigration.  By 1956, emigration levels 
had reached their highest position since the Great Famine, resulting in a society greatly 
troubled by its circumstances and wary about the direction of the nation.19 
 The importance of the 1950s in Ireland’s economic history cannot be overstated.  
Disillusioned by the social and economic ills produced by stagnation, policymakers 
reoriented Ireland’s economic outlook to accommodate changes in global structures.  
Some historians have labeled the economic crisis of these years as “the defining event of 
post-war Irish economic history.”20 In 1957, Fianna Fáil was returned to power in the 
Dáil, and a new man emerged as the leader of the party: Seán Lemass.  As Lemass 
encountered a nation without a clear direction, he sought to transform Ireland’s economic 
and social orientation, from one characterized by an inward looking society based on self-
sufficiency, to a more outward approach that called for Ireland to integrate itself on a 
much higher level within both the European and global economic systems. 
 Did protectionism and the program of economic nationalism work?  As can be 
seen, this is a question that is still open to debate.  Proponents of protectionism contend 
                                                        
18 Ó Gráda, A Rocky Road, 25. 
19 Bielenberg and Ryan, An Economic History, 19. 
20 Bielenberg and Ryan, An Economic History, 19. 
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that the approach instituted by De Valera reordered the Irish economy to focus more on 
industrial development, rather than the historical predominance of agriculture.  
Furthermore, the extenuating international circumstances brought on by the Great 
Depression and World War II, forced Ireland to accommodate itself within a broader 
framework of economic uncertainty.  Evidence from the 1930s suggests that the 
processes begun by Seán Lemass generated benefits in industrial employment and 
production.  However, subsequent phases in Ireland’s economic development were 
necessarily curtailed by Dev and Lemass in the late 1930s, as Ireland had to deal with the 
drastic economic concerns created by the Second World War.  Critics of De Valera’s 
economic program would highlight the fact that during the period between Independence 
and the 1950s, Irish economic performance lagged behind European standards, especially 
in relation to Britain and Northern Ireland in particular.  However, if we view the 
economy in a broader historical and international context, the post-Independence period 
produced an economy that was much more domestically developed than it had been prior 
to 1922,  that had begun the course toward industrial development, and that had also built 
a social, political, and economic infrastructure that allowed subsequent growth to be 
realized on a scale previously not thought to be possible. 
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II. Sink or Swim: Laying the Foundations in the Lemass Era 
The general consensus among historians regarding the advent of the “Lemass 
Era” of the 1960s is that it represented a watershed in Irish society, most notably in the 
realm of economics.  Though this period in Irish history lasted only for seven years 
between 1959, when Seán Lemass became Taoiseach, and 1966, the effects and 
consequences of this period were profound.  Not only did the governments headed by 
Lemass introduce an economic outlook predicated on export-orientation, they also 
reoriented the political discourse that had dominated Ireland since Independence. 
 The lasting impact from this period, however, is much more complex.  In terms of 
the parameters of this discussion, this era introduced the economic outlook that carried on 
through subsequent decades.  Though export-oriented growth was instrumental in this 
broader context, the role of the state in policy-making complicated this process.  As trade 
liberalization became the primary tool of the state in its policy formulation, this created 
an awkward dichotomy within broader ideological economic frameworks in which an 
apparent contradiction between neoliberal economic policy and active state intervention 
materializes.  This in turn resulted in a precarious economic situation in which 
macroeconomic circumstances produced policy that was geared toward integrating 
Ireland within the larger global economy.  As will be seen, this process is complicated for 
small, dependent economies like Ireland’s. 
 The process of reorienting Ireland’s economy from one based on protectionism 
and self-sufficiency, to one more open to foreign trade and investment, was not solely the 
product of Lemass himself.  In fact, scholars have highlighted the fact that various policy 
mechanisms were proposed and enacted before he took over as Ireland’s leader in 1959.  
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Andy Bielenberg and Raymond Ryan have noted this quite astutely.  With the second 
inter party government of Fine Gael and Labour in 1956, economic policymakers slowly 
began to seek integration within international structures.  The most significant way in 
which this was formulated was through the enactment of Export Profits Tax Relief in the 
same year.  This not only lowered the tax burden on firms that were part of the 
indigenous economy, but also allowed the few foreign companies operating in Ireland to 
enjoy lower corporate taxes.21 Bielenberg and Ryan argue that this laid the groundwork 
for future corporate tax structures that made Ireland the tax haven of multinational 
corporations in later decades; this became an important component of the Celtic Tiger.  
Furthermore, they also note that even in 1953, Taoiseach John Costello argued for some 
dismantling of the Control of Manufactures Acts in order to induce foreign investment. 
 These instances give us a more nuanced view not only of Seán Lemass, but also 
of the process of economic reorientation.  To add more to this perspective, Bielenberg 
and Ryan point to the work of Bryce Evans and Ronan Fanning.  Fanning argues that 
Lemass was simply a lucky bystander in a period in which European, and particularly 
British, growth rates achieved high levels.  But Evans is the scholar who introduces an 
issue that is perhaps of more significant consideration and importance.  He argues that, “a 
national coming of age…happened to coincide with his [Lemass’] own coming of age.”22 
While it is understandable how Evans would come to this viewpoint, the context behind 
this assumption requires further analysis. 
 As previously discussed, Lemass was the primary underling of Eamon de Valera 
during the latter’s time as Taoiseach.  During this period, Lemass staunchly advocated for 
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direct intervention in industrial development as Minister of Industry and Commerce, and 
to even a greater extent as Minister of Supplies during the Emergency years.  His 
economic ideology was largely regarded as protectionist.  However, as the period wore 
on, Lemass began to develop a more “pragmatic” outlook in regards to economic policy 
by adopting Keynesian views.  This is evident in Lemass’s advocacy of state-intervention 
in a free trade environment, resulting in a mixed economy.  It is apparent from his various 
policy implementations during his time in office, as well as his tenuous alliance with T.K. 
Whitaker, that by 1959 Lemass no longer adhered to state-sanctioned protectionism and 
De Valera’s brand of economic nationalism.  But how did this come about?  This is 
where Evans’ argument comes into play. 
 As the generation of politicians concerned with republican and nationalist ideas 
began to fade away, new political leaders began to take their place.  This younger 
generation was removed from the bitter fighting that precipitated the Irish Civil War and 
poisoned political discourse in subsequent decades.  While Lemass was not necessarily 
part of this new generation, his influence in reshaping Irish politics greatly impacted his 
new political peers.  During this period, political and social discourse was reoriented to 
place more of an emphasis on economic progress and prosperity.  Not only did Lemass 
participate in this discourse, he helped mold it to fit within his own framework.23 
 It has hopefully become evident that the “gloom and doom” years of the early 
1950s resulted in a reexamination of Ireland’s political and economic orthodoxy.  
Concerns over attitudes toward nationalism and self-sufficiency were gradually being 
replaced with an approach more tailored toward economic rejuvenation.  Using the 
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political skills he had acquired in over thirty years of public service, Lemass transformed 
nationalism from being founded on territorial integrity and self-reliance, to a nationalism 
grounded in economic self-respect.  Lemass sought to gain this respect by proving Ireland 
was a viable economic entity within the broader economic sphere.  To Lemass, self-
reliance was no longer the program to be emphasized by the political apparatus, but 
rather sustainability and prosperity within a liberalizing economic environment. 
 Furthermore, Lemass was able to merge his new nationalism with the issue of 
Partition, especially against more ideological nationalists.  Henry Patterson summarizes 
Lemass’ stance on this facet of the issue stating, “Economic success became the supreme 
national value because only through it could national unity be restored.”24  Though 
political discourse continued to be the dominating force in shaping the issue of Partition, 
it is evident that Lemass was at the very least trying to reorient this issue to fit within his 
economic program. 
 Between 1959 and 1972, industrial output in Ireland grew at 5.9 percent annually, 
the manufacturing work force grew by almost 25 percent, and industrial exports as a 
percentage of total exports grew at a rapid pace.25  It is clear that Lemass was able to 
generate a period of great industrial productivity that helped Ireland secure a better 
position within the Western economic sphere.  But how did this rapid increase in 
production come about? 
 Lemass recognized that trade liberalization was perhaps the only route toward 
economic prosperity.  In turn, he sought to remove some of the barriers that he himself 
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had formulated and put in place during the period of protectionism in the 1930s, such as 
the Control of Manufactures Acts of 1932 and 1934.  Furthermore, Lemass and his 
government implemented a variety of policy mechanisms and state-run organizations that 
would work to create efficiency within indigenous industry, while also working to attract 
foreign investment through a wide variety of means.  It will become clear that these broad 
conceptions would come to characterize Irish economic policy through the twentieth 
century. 
 A general misconception regarding this period in economic history is the central 
role of T.K. Whitaker.  Though undoubtedly Whitaker maintained substantial influence 
as Secretary of Finance during this period, it has become clear that much of the 
formulation of state policy was not his doing.  Brian Girvin illuminates this by 
highlighting the discrepancies between Whitaker’s policy proposal entitled Economic 
Deevlopment (1958), and the Programme for Economic Expansion, published as a White 
Paper upon Lemass’ ascension as Taoiseach in 1959.  Girvin does note that there are 
similarities between the two documents, but he characterizes Whitaker’s Economic 
Devlopment as a “transitional document, one that attempts to face up to the complex 
aspects of a changing society, but finally opts for the traditional policy style and 
approach.”26  Whitaker’s proposals were traditional in the sense that they continued to 
emphasize export-oriented agriculture, restrict demand through deflationary budgets, and 
maintain the primacy of the Department of Finance in policy-making.  Patterson notes 
that the only similarity with Lemass’ Programme was “in its recommendations for an 
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easing of the restrictions on foreign investment, for a move towards freer trade, and in 
favour, at least formally, of the need for a development perspective to be at the centre of 
state policy.”27 
 In contrast to Whitaker’s advocacy of traditional policy, Lemass’ Programme for 
Economic Expansion offered new positive alternatives that would shift government’s role 
entirely in regards to the economy.  Lemass believed the government had a role in 
developing Ireland’s economic resources.  But the main conduit through which this was 
to be accomplished was through industrial expansion and export-led growth.  The 
primary way to achieve this, Lemass argued, was to open access to capital aimed at 
productivity.  In particular, Lemass hoped that the vast majority of productive investment 
would be from private sources.  In his White Paper, Lemass stated: “the primary aim of 
government policy in the industrial sector, therefore, is to stimulate a vast increase in 
private industrial investment.”28  In conjunction with his attempt to stimulate investment, 
Lemass noted the development of the Irish banking sector.  He argued that, “the facilities 
provided by the banks, financial institutions, and the stock exchanges are of great 
importance in securing that capital is placed at the disposal of productive enterprise.”29 
 Apart from industry, Lemass also recognized that agriculture did have a role to 
play in the nation’s economic development.  While his primary focus was still 
concentrated on industrial expansion, Lemass hoped to promote agricultural exports by 
increasing output and lowering costs.  He contended that this would allow Irish 
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agriculture to remain competitive in the expanding and opening of European markets, 
stating: 
The test of agricultural policy, therefore, is whether in the long run it enables 
output to be increased at costs which exports profitable without subsidization. On 
this depends not only the possibility of a higher income for the agricultural 
community but the future development of the whole economy.30 
  
But perhaps the most important aspect of Lemass’ Programme for Economic 
Expansion was his vision of the future role of the state in terms of economic 
development.  Lemass acknowledged that the onset of trade liberalization would force the 
government to evolve new attitudes toward economic development, specifically in 
contrast to the previous era’s policies of protectionism.  He stated: “it would be 
unrealistic, in the light of the probable emergence of a Free Trade area, to rely on a policy 
of protection similar to that applied over the last 25 years or so.”31  He would go on to say 
that, “the rules of the Free Trade area require a gradual and systematic reduction of 
existing tariffs.”32  Additionally, Lemass also sought to maintain state aid in 
development, but to place the primary emphasis on private investment.  The state’s 
fundamental role would be to encourage productive investment.  This was to be done by 
providing cheap access to capital, maintaining some form of protection for emerging 
infant industries, and also attracting foreign investment. 
 The first way in which Lemass enacted his foreign investment program was 
through the amendment of the Control of Manufactures Acts.  As stated before, this was a 
policy proposed earlier in the decade by the government led by John Costello.  However, 
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this process did not commence until 1958, and the Acts were not fully repealed until 
1964.33  Though the repeal of the Acts could be viewed as a largely symbolic gesture to 
the increasing free trade mindset of the Western economic sphere, there is no doubt that 
over the next decade, foreign investment in Ireland increased dramatically.  In 1973, 
40,000 people were employed in foreign owned firms, representing one-fifth of the 
industrial workforce.34  By the end of the 1960s industrial exports surpassed agricultural 
exports in value.35  
 Along with policy implementation aimed at attracting foreign investment, the 
government also set out on a publicity blitz to announce to the world that Ireland was 
open for business.  The primary avenue through which this was accomplished was 
through the Industrial Development Authority.  Though this state-run apparatus was 
founded in 1949, it was not until the Lemass era that it was really put to work and fully 
implemented.  The main purpose of the IDA was to help stimulate industrial growth 
through grants and other financial incentives. Between 1960 and 1973, the IDA aided in 
setting up 418 businesses, of which 352 were still in operation in 1973.  These businesses 
alone created 44,822 new jobs.  However, Conor McCabe has brought to light the fact 
that perhaps the IDA did not accomplish the goal it had initially set out with in terms of 
industrial development.  Instead, McCabe provides figures that show only thirty percent 
of the jobs created were in the industrial sector, while the remaining seventy percent 
“were created in commerce, construction, professional and public service employment, 
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banking and insurance.”36 This is an important aspect to note, particularly in terms of the 
commerce, banking, and insurance sectors, as these categories were important in the 
advent of the services industry, which would later assume a primary role in the Celtic 
Tiger boom. 
 Apart from attracting foreign investment, Lemass also recognized that in order to 
develop industry and the economy in general, relations between labor and capital in 
Ireland would have to be strengthened.  To accomplish this, Lemass set out to create a 
corporatist model that would create an alliance between unions, business, and the Irish 
state.  In the Programme, Lemass asserted: “restrictive practices, whether by employers 
or labor, inflate costs of production and distribution and retard the expansion of output 
and employment… It is essential, therefore, that restrictive practices be abolished and it 
will be an object of government policy to secure enlightened cooperation.”37  His 
proposals outlined in the Programme for Economic Expansion were received with great 
approval by the unions, with ITGWU lauding “its imagination, initiative, enthusiasm, and 
tendency to long term planning which has attracted many new industries to the 
country.”38 This alliance with the unions was vital to Lemass’ vision of corporatism. 
 So what did this partnership mean for economic growth? Though it is evident that 
something positive was gained by this version of corporatism, unions suffered most of its 
negative consequences.  The main purpose behind corporatism was to increase Ireland’s 
competitiveness within the European labor market.  This was accomplished primarily 
through controlling wage demands.  In return for adherence to wage controls, trade 
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unions were acceded some form of role within policymaking.  Whether this trade-off was 
successful is quite ambiguous.  In 1964, Ireland led the world in terms of man-hours lost 
through labor stoppages.  However, Lemass somewhat alleviated labor strife through 
small-scale increases in social spending, and also by providing generous concessions in 
the 1964 national wage agreements.  These indeed did assuage some of the unions’ 
concerns as Fianna Fáil actually increased its representation in the Dáil in the 1965 
elections, due considerably to the relationship with trade union leaders.  Patterson 
highlights the fact that this was the first time Fianna Fáil was able to gain votes as the 
incumbent leadership.39 
 But more than the development of corporatism’s immediate effects, the formation 
of a partnership between the unions, business, and government set a precedent that was to 
be followed over twenty years later with the social partnership of the 1980s.  Once again, 
this projected Ireland as an economic entity that “had its house in order” and was friendly 
to foreign interests.  Furthermore, it established the state’s central role in economic 
planning. 
 Improvement in education was another aspect of Lemass’ policy program that 
would have a future impact on the Irish economy.  During the 1960s, it was recognized 
that economic goals could not be attained “without a transformation of the quality and 
quantity of education.”40 Throughout the decade the Department of Education sought to 
improve regional educational equality, as well as expand opportunity for students with 
less financial means.  Between 1961 and 1963, the amount of secondary-school 
scholarships tripled from 621 to 1775 with the help of state aid.  With the appointment of 
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Donogh O’Malley as Minster of Education in 1965, the process of opening educational 
opportunity accelerated, as his primary initiative was the introduction of free secondary 
education.  Though O’Malley died in 1968, his enterprise in this regard was undoubtedly 
successful. By 1969, the number of secondary students had grown to 144,000, compared 
to just over 100,000 three years previously.41 
 At the university level, the Department of Education also looked to increase 
educational opportunity for those less affluent.  Between 1968 and 1975, the number of 
state grants given to university students increased from 1119 to 6168.  Additionally, 
initiatives were enacted to provide polytechnic education in areas that the university 
curriculum largely neglected.42  Though some of these developments did not have the 
immediate effect that had been hoped for, improvement in education created a more 
skilled and knowledgeable workforce that in the future would be promoted as one of the 
greatest benefits of doing business in Ireland. 
 So was the Lemass Era a period of economic success?  It is evident from 
employment figures, as well as economic growth in general, that from 1960 to 1973 the 
Irish economy performed well in a historical perspective.  However, Ireland still lagged 
behind other European countries in various economic indicators.  While many observes 
have considered this a revolutionary moment in Ireland’s economic history, it is 
important to state that Ireland did not move toward classical laissez faire policy.  Instead, 
Lemass and his government sought to use the structures and powers of the state to guide 
the economy in a pragmatic direction.  Some have characterized Lemass during this 
period as turning away from his nationalist roots grounded in protectionism and Irish 
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self-sufficiency.  It would be fairer to characterizing him as flexible in shaping his 
ideology and subsequent policy to conform to the necessities of changing circumstances 
at home and abroad. 
This raises the issue of whether Ireland was developing positively as a result of 
the various policy mechanisms Lemass put in place, or if the Irish were simply along for 
the ride of economic expansion within Europe.  This is a topic still debated by scholars.  
As will become evident in the next chapter, international integration was central to 
Ireland’s economic growth, and the structures put in place by Lemass worked to 
accentuate progress and prosperity, but within an international context. 
So though Lemass may not be solely responsible for Ireland’s economic 
rejuvenation, the period in which he presided as Taoiseach was significant in reshaping 
Irish society.  Brian Girvin states, “In a broad sense Ireland acquired ‘modernity’ during 
this decade, becoming increasingly industrialised, secularised, urbanised, and 
bureaucratised.”43  Furthermore, this period affirmed the belief of older nationalists that 
independence could produce social and economic prosperity for Ireland, even though this 
was not accomplished through the previous brand of economic nationalism, which had 
been pursued by elder nationalists to fulfill the Sinn Féin ideal of “ourselves alone.” 
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III. Laying the Foundations, Part II: Understanding European Integration 
The process of Ireland’s integration into the wider European economic sphere is a 
process that historians have frequently looked to in order to understand Irish economic 
growth during the 1960s and early 1970s.  As it became evident to policymakers during 
this period that situating Ireland within a larger economic community could 
hypothetically be beneficial to the nation’s economy, policies on broad and local levels 
were reoriented to fit within the emergence of a European framework.  It was the 
formation of supranational organizations such as the European Economic Community 
(EEC) and the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) that compelled the Irish 
government to form policy that was congruent with mechanisms such as trade 
liberalization as well as favorable to Ireland’s international economic reputation.  
European integration was a long process in which various stages of assimilation were 
attained along the way, culminating ultimately in Ireland’s accession to the EEC in 1973.  
Understanding this process is necessary to elucidate the shape that the Irish economy 
would take, domestically and internationally, leading into the period before the rise of the 
Celtic Tiger. 
 As previously noted, Ireland’s real experience with European integration began 
during the post-WWII period with the influx of Marshall Plan funds and participation in 
the Organization for European Economic Co-operation (OEEC) in 1947.44  While the 
significance of Irish participation in the OEEC is disputed, this development ultimately 
marked the advent of economic cooperation with Europe by the Irish government.  
Materially, however, ERP funding did little to stimulate the Irish economy, as much of 
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the postwar boom was facilitated by increased consumption that was spurred by Irish 
consumers’ desire to “make up for lost time.”45  Brian Girvin has argued that the OEEC 
was relatively less significant than the trade agreements devised with the British 
government in 1948; these had a much larger real impact on the Irish economy, as they 
ensured greater access for Irish agricultural exports to Britain while still allowing the 
Irish government to maintain much of its previous tariff system.46  It is clear that during 
the immediate postwar period, Ireland’s economic outlook was still geared toward the 
domestic market.  Apart from the developments outlined in the introduction, Ireland 
declined to partake in the newly formed International Monetary Fund (IMF), and rejected 
participation in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), both of which were 
constructed in 1948.47 
 However, Ireland’s abstention from international economic affairs began to lessen 
during the 1950s.  With the formation of the EEC in 1957, the first supranational 
economic alliance in Europe came to fruition.  The countries that made up the initial 
makeup of the EEC included Luxembourg, Belgium, the Netherlands, Italy, West 
Germany, and France.  Other than Great Britain, these countries constituted the most 
economically vibrant countries of Europe.  In response to formation of the EEC, Britain 
led the way in forming the European Free Trade Association two years later with six 
other European countries. 
 The implications of these developments for Ireland were immense.  Shortly after 
the formal establishment of the EEC in 1957, Ireland elected to join the IMF and also 
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began to participate in the World Bank.  But in terms of participating within either of the 
two European economic alliances, the EEC or the EFTA, the Irish government took its 
time to decide which would be of more benefit to Ireland.  However, this decision was 
made more difficult for a couple of reasons.  First, the Irish economy during this period 
was still ultimately dependent on British markets.  Any action that looked to circumvent 
economic ties with Britain would have unknown consequences and repercussions from 
Britain.  Second, at this point, Ireland’s economic prospects were viewed in a relatively 
negative light by many Western countries, and its participation within the EEC would 
have been broadly seen as bringing nothing to the table for the other participating 
countries.  This is not to say that Irish policymakers did not look at integration within 
these larger frameworks as beneficial.  The EEC in fact was seen as more attractive to 
Ireland due to its quite favorable attitudes toward agriculture as manifested in its CAP 
(Common Agricultural Policy) mechanisms.  But the prospect of joining the EEC was 
pointless without British presence in the organization.  Furthermore, the Irish government 
was wary of Britain’s sponsorship of the EFTA, as British participation in the EFTA 
could possibly foster new trading relationships between Britain and other European 
countries, thus weakening Anglo-Irish economic ties.  However, by the end of the 1950s 
Britain reassessed its position in European trade networks, and began to adopt a more 
favorable attitude toward joining the EEC.  In turn, Great Britain applied to join the EEC 
in 1961.  Already with a positive outlook toward the EEC and its CAP guarantees, plus 
the wish to maintain economic ties with Britain, Ireland followed suit in application. In 
an effort to secure admission to the EEC, Lemass himself made a plea to the six founding 
members of the community on January 18, 1962. In his statement to the ministers of the 
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six governments of the EEC, Lemass hoped to clarify that Ireland was working at a rapid 
pace to ensure a more open economy, and also hoped to make it clear that the Irish 
government was fully committed to European integration.  In regards to the 
correspondence of Ireland’s agricultural and industrial sectors, Lemass explained his 
intentions to create a dynamic balance in developing both sectors, stating: 
I propose to deal first with agriculture, which has a particularly important place in 
our economy. It generates about one-quarter of the national income, employs over 
one-third of the gainfully-occupied population, and is responsible, directly or 
indirectly, for three-quarters of our exports. With the development of industry 
these proportions will decline, but for Ireland agriculture will always be of major 
importance. We are, naturally, anxious that, through membership of the European 
Economic Community, Ireland should be able to look forward to a balanced 
development of agriculture and industry.48 
 
In attempting to sell Ireland’s recent success in industrial development, Lemass 
highlighted a variety of statistical measures that exhibited Ireland’s recent patterns of 
growth to the six member governments: 
A Programme for Economic Expansion initiated in 1958, the objectives of which 
are entirely consistent with those of the Community, has had encouraging results. 
The volume increase in gross national product, which averaged only 1 percent per 
annum in the preceding decade, amounted to 4 ½ percent in 1959, 5 percent in 
1960, and not less than 5 per cent, it is estimated , in 1961. The greater part of this 
expansion is attributable to the industrial sector.49 
 
Lemass concluded this portion of his speech by stating, “These results confirm not only 
the considerable scope for economic development in Ireland but the capacity of Irish 
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initiative and effort, augmented by Western European enterprises to exploit the existing 
potentialities.”50 
 In concluding his statement to the EEC, Lemass addressed the Irish economy’s 
close relationship with that of Britain’s.  He affirmed the close ties between them and 
requested that the two nations’ requests for admission be taken together.  Lemass 
proposed: “Because of the close inter-relationship of the economy of Ireland and that of 
the United Kingdom, and the vital interest of Ireland in agricultural trade, the Irish 
government would hope that the discussions for the admission of Ireland to the 
Community might be brought to completion at the same time as those for the United 
Kingdom.”51  However, member status for both countries was quickly vetoed by French 
President Charles de Gaulle in 1963.  For Ireland this blackball was multifaceted.  Not 
only did de Gaulle recognize the inherent link between Britain and Ireland in refusing 
Irish accession, but furthermore, at this time Ireland’s lack of actual development was 
still apparent.  However, Ireland’s application also informed other European countries 
that the Irish economy, as well as Irish society in general, was becoming more “modern,” 
and that the Irish government was laying the groundwork for economic structures that 
would be favorable to cooperation within a broader European sphere. 
 Bielenberg and Ryan view this episode as vital to understanding the onset of 
Ireland’s open economy.  They argue that Ireland’s first unsuccessful bid “laid important 
ground work that contributed to the perception among existing members that it was a 
credible candidate,” and also “bought much needed time for the Irish economy to make 
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some of the initial adjustments to free trade.”52 Additionally, they argue that the failed 
bids of Britain and Ireland both reopened and strengthened their economic ties, 
culminating in the Anglo-Irish Free Trade Agreements (AIFTA) of 1965.53 
 Though Irish nationalists would certainly decry the agreements reached between 
Ireland and Britain in 1965, the economic alliance produced during this time had both 
immediate and lasting ramifications for the Irish economy.  The direct benefits for the 
economy during this period were varied.  Fitzgerald argues that AIFTA “gave it [Ireland] 
the chance to develop the range and quality of its products for expanded markets on a 
reasonably gradual basis.”54 He also highlights the fact that closer links with Britain 
allowed the country to prepare for broader cooperation with other economies, as well as 
providing Ireland some degree of security during a time when future economic prospects 
were quite uncertain. Although the IDA looked to attract foreign investment, as well as 
other export markets for Irish goods, Great Britain remained the predominant “partner” in 
Irish economic affairs, with seventy percent of Irish goods destined to the UK. 
Additionally, AIFTA also had political implications that worked to somewhat 
alleviate nationalist concerns over the new agreements.  Among these was the return of 
the remains of Roger Casement to Ireland for reburial, as well as the flag raised over the 
GPO during the Easter Rising of 1916.  The political benefits should not be overlooked in 
this case, as they worked to promote cooperation between the two countries. 
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With the economic relationship with Great Britain secured during this period, 
Ireland still ventured to expand its outward orientation.  One aspect of these 
developments that should not be overlooked is that there was a broad consensus among 
the Irish political elite that joining the EEC would be advantageous.  With momentum 
toward integration building once again after the signing of AIFTA, both Ireland and 
Britain re-applied for EEC membership in 1967.  Once again, they were both turned away 
by de Gaulle.  But at this point, as Fitzgerald notes, it was apparent that Paris was the 
main obstacle to EEC ascension, not economic or political deficiencies.55 With the 
resignation of de Gaulle in 1969 as President of France, Ireland’s eventual membership in 
the EEC was inevitable.   
In the meantime, the Irish government furthered its liberalization efforts by 
joining the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade in 1967.  Additionally, the 
retirement of Seán Lemass took place in 1966.  Some scholars have viewed this as the 
point at which a new generation of political leadership came to power in Ireland.  I would 
argue that although true in terms of age, this was not the case in terms of ideology.  First, 
the fact that Lemass’ Finance Minister, Jack Lynch, succeeded him as Taoiseach shows 
continuity with the previous government’s political and economic ambitions.  But 
perhaps more importantly, the new political leadership was very much molded by Lemass 
during this period, as he looked to turn away from older nationalist leanings and toward a 
new era in Irish politics shaped by economic and social modernization.  These processes 
were not curtailed by the new leadership, but in fact continued. 
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With EEC membership still at the forefront of the government’s plans for 
economic expansion, negotiations in the Dáil for a third and final bid commenced in 
1970.  These were eventually concluded in January of 1972, and Ireland’s bid was 
ratified the following May.  The following year, the European Economic Community 
accepted the Irish membership bid, and Ireland was formally admitted as an EEC 
partner.56 
The implications of Ireland’s entrance to the EEC have been widely discussed by 
a variety of scholars.  F.S.L. Lyons has argued that being too close in time to events does 
not allow for a comprehensive historical perspective, and that this is the constant 
dilemma for contemporary historians.57  However, we can trace the immediate benefits 
and consequences of European integration, and elucidate how these would come to 
drastically reshape the orientation of the Irish economy as well as the ideology driving its 
outlook. 
Thus, a cost-benefit analysis of Ireland’s EEC accession is imperative.  The costs 
of Ireland’s European integration are perhaps less evident than its benefits.  On a more 
micro scale, Bielenberg and Ryan have noted the negative impact of the EEC’s Common 
Fisheries Policy on Ireland.  As part of this policy, all community members had equal 
access to offshore waters.  Ireland was able to secure a twelve-mile offshore limit to 
protect its domestic fishing industry, but this did little to provide security for the fishing 
industry in Ireland, and ultimately this sector of the economy suffered rather than 
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benefitted from EEC membership.  Furthermore, Ireland was fiscally responsible for 
contributing 0.6 percent of its GDP annually to the EEC’s community budget.58 
These small-scale costs, however, were overshadowed by the broader 
implications of EEC membership.  Maurice Fitzgerald has discussed a variety of such 
greater costs, including the dilution of Ireland’s neutrality and nationalism, two 
inextricably linked features of Irish politics.  Fitzgerald notes that since Independence, 
neutrality had been the cornerstone of Irish foreign policy.  As discussed above, this was 
evident in Ireland’s abstention from WWII as well as its rejection of participation in 
NATO.  The EEC presented a problem in maintaining Ireland’s traditional neutral policy 
due to the fact that, although predominantly an economic organization, the EEC was also 
grounded in political cooperation.  However, as Ireland’s desire to join the EEC became 
more evident throughout the 1960s, it was clear to other member countries that Ireland’s 
neutrality policy would not pose a threat to its becoming a member.  Bill McSweeney has 
observed, “Ireland’s policy of neutrality has always been conditional upon the possibility 
of abandoning it for a political end.”59 The EEC represented such a political end.  Thus, 
Ireland’s primary foreign policy mechanism was largely subverted by European 
integration.   
Secondly, Fitzgerald’s discussion of the implications of EEC membership for 
Irish nationalism are quite intricate.  Historically, nationalism represented one of 
Ireland’s primary political features.  However, participation in the EEC could represent a 
threat to nationalism, as it would prompt a move toward a more European outlook.  But 
for a variety of reasons, these concerns were alleviated.  The reorientation of nationalist 
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political discourse was the primary reason for this assuagement.  Economic growth had 
now become the new nationalist aim, and the EEC presented an avenue through which 
this could be secured.  Furthermore, the historical importance of agrarian society in 
nationalist discourse had been greatly transformed with the perceived benefits of 
integration.  This is evident in the EEC’s Common Agricultural Policy, which would 
greatly enhance the economic vitality of rural farmers.  Thus, European integration and 
its attractiveness to agriculture mitigated the role rural society played in shaping 
nationalism. 60 
Fitzgerald concludes his analysis of these consequences by stating: “nationalism 
became a very secondary consideration; the collective Irish psyche was weighing up the 
advantages of ‘Europeanism.’”61 But what were these advantages? The prospects of the 
community’s CAP policy were obviously beneficial to Ireland’s rural community.  But 
even apart from CAP, there were other benefits to agriculture. First, increased 
subsidization through central funds would ensure stability in the agricultural sector, while 
also improving the farmers’ financial standing through higher fixed prices.  Secondly, the 
EEC would add a more diverse market base within which farming could increase both the 
variety of its produce and the amount of its total exports.  Interestingly, Fitzgerald also 
argues that these benefits would also “slow down the rural to urban population shift” that 
Ireland was experiencing during this period of modernization.62 
Along with agriculture, the EEC offered a more diverse export base for the 
industrial sector as well. By 1974, “new industry accounted for over sixty percent of 
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industrial output.”63 Between 1973 and 1979, manufacturing output sustained an annual 
growth rate of 5.1 percent.64  Efficiency in manufacturing also increased.  Between 1968 
and 1985 Ireland’s net output per worker surpassed levels in Great Britain, rising from 82 
percent to 128 percent of British levels.  However, these metrics can be somewhat 
misleading, as employment levels in manufacturing remained stagnant during the 1970s, 
even as production grew. 65  As will be explored in the next chapter, low employment 
levels would become one of the more pressing concerns faced by Irish society.  
But perhaps most importantly, Irish membership in the EEC reduced economic 
dependence on Great Britain.  Though Britain remained Ireland’s dominant individual 
trading partner throughout the rest of the century, 1973 marked the point at which Ireland 
turned away from Great Britain and toward Europe.66  Fitzgerald notes, “in 1966 nearly 
70% of total Irish goods went to the UK.” 67  However, by 1992 only thirty-two percent 
of Irish exports were bound for Great Britain, compared to forty-three percent of exports 
to other EU countries.68  While the Lemass Era reoriented the makeup of Irish exports to 
include more industrial-based products, EEC membership reoriented their destination. 
But did all this change anything immensely for the Irish economy?  It is evident 
that this period saw a restructuring of Ireland’s sovereignty, toward a more European 
dimension.  It should also be noted that the EEC offered the prospect, rather than the 
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guarantee, of economic prosperity.  This sense of hope created an era of good feelings in 
Ireland, as evidenced in the sweeping political coalition that regarded the EEC as the 
most positive and forward-looking possibility for subsequent economic growth. 
However, arguments for the benefits of European Economic Community could be 
offset by the argument that integration merely transformed Ireland from a British neo-
colony to an EEC neo-colony.  Furthermore, economic liberalization and participation in 
global markets prompted Ronnie Munck to declare that Ireland was a “small, subordinate 
cog in an enormous capitalist wheel.”69  There have been attempts to challenge these 
assertions by suggesting that European integration could assuage swift or long-term 
economic shocks.  But this belief would soon be undermined by the global economic 
malaise of the mid and late 1970s. 
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IV. 1973-82: The Forgotten Era 
The period immediately following Ireland’s accession to the European Economic 
Community (which would later become the European Union) is an era that has been 
largely overlooked by Irish historians in terms of economic performance.  Obviously, 
from 1968 on, the evolution of the Troubles would put more of a focus on politics during 
this time, but it remains that 1973 to 1982 also represents a period in which international 
circumstances and domestic policy once again reshaped the orientation and operation of 
the Irish economy.  Thus, it is necessary to examine the international economic situation 
as it pertains to Ireland during this period, as well as the reactive government policy that 
would come to plague the country’s finances and usher in an era of rising government 
spending. 
 Shortly after gaining membership in the EEC, Ireland faced its first challenge as 
an integrated part of the international economic community.  Following entry, the Irish 
economy actually became more exposed to both European and global fluctuations.  But 
for Ireland, 1973 also marked a political turning point, as a coalition government led by 
Liam Cosgrave took power in the Dáil.  To meet the onset of the first oil shock of 1973, 
Cosgrave developed a new form of fiscal policy that looked to stave off an economic 
downturn through public spending.  To better understand these policy directions and their 
consequences, an analysis of the tenets and formulation of fiscal policy is in order.70 
 Essentially, the debate regarding fiscal policy is split between two divergent 
ideological positions.  The first of these is very much in line with neoclassical economic 
theory.  Fundamentally, this school of thought “attaches a low value to fiscal policy as an 
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independent instrument of macroeconomic management.”71 Any form of public spending 
should only be implemented with regard to economic efficiency, and should also be 
independent of “natural” market forces.  Furthermore, this model is based on the 
assumption that shocks to the market system are created through interference in the 
market by taxation or other forms of public interference.72 
 Contrary to the neoclassical model, the Keynesian school advocates an activist 
approach to fiscal policy that places a great emphasis on demand management.  The basic 
tenets of Keynesianism accept that modern economic structures are inherently unsteady 
and that government spending can be a mechanism to sustain some semblance of 
economic stability.  Thus, when economic output is below the level that would be 
achieved with full employment, the government should implement an expansionary fiscal 
agenda, including lowering taxes and/or increasing public spending, to stimulate levels of 
demand.  On the contrary, when periods of growth above levels of full employment are 
being experienced, Keynesianism would call for taxes to be raised or spending to be cut, 
in order to stabilize output and reduce the prospect of unexpected shocks to the economic 
system.  However, Keynesianism is quite ambiguous as to the levels of taxation or 
spending that would be sufficient in either situation. 
 During the postwar period and carrying into the 1970s, Keynesianism was 
dominant in the Western economic sphere.  Interestingly, the advent of the Phillips Curve 
in 1958 theorized that there was a stable yet inverse relationship between inflation and 
unemployment, concluding that rising levels of both could not be experienced during the 
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same period.  However, the first oil shock of 1973 made evident that this was not the 
case.  In response to the crisis brought on by the first oil shock, the government reacted 
with increasing levels of public spending, in hopes of stimulating demand.73 
 However, Anthony Leddin and Jim O’Leary have identified Ireland as an 
anomaly of sorts due to its status as a small open economy.  Because of this, they argue 
that Ireland is more fundamentally supply-oriented than demand-oriented within global 
economic structures.  Furthermore, as Ireland turned away from domestic demand to 
export-oriented growth, expansionary fiscal measures would do little to spur economic 
growth.74  Thus, it is evident that an economy such as Ireland’s within this international 
context could be seen as more vulnerable for two concurrent reasons.  First, in an 
international economic downturn, countries that would encourage demand through 
lowering taxes or raising spending would be attempting to incite domestic growth, thus 
inhibiting preexisting patterns of trade.  Countries heavily dependent on free trade and 
exports (such as Ireland in this circumstance) would suffer the most in an economic 
environment in which free trade is not the primary mechanism through which to stimulate 
growth.  Concurrently, in an export-oriented economy, expansionary fiscal measures 
would be of little consequence unless they were directed toward domestic demand and 
domestic production.   
 However, in reaction to the first oil shock, Ireland did indeed introduce 
expansionary fiscal policy measures.  While these did work in a sense to offset the 
economic malaise of these years, the economy swiftly recovered by 1975, much like the 
other Western economies, after the oil embargo was lifted.  What part fiscal policy played 
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in alleviating a domestic slump is difficult to ascertain.  However, it is apparent that the 
most important result of these developments was the precedent of deficit spending.75 
 Deficit spending would continue unimpeded for the rest of the decade and into the 
early years of the 1980s.  The coherence and logic of this policy is highly questionable, as 
it followed neither the neoclassical nor the Keynesian framework in that spending 
continued without regard to changing economic circumstances.  The deficit spending 
introduced by the younger Cosgrave’s government would be continued and accentuated 
by Fianna Fáil in 1977 when it took back control of the Dáil.  The primary reason for 
Fianna Fáil’s election victory was its “irresponsible election programme that advocated 
tax reduction and increased public spending” in a time that did not call for either to 
stimulate the economy.76 
 However, it is interesting to note that throughout the latter years of the 1970s, the 
economy continued to perform well.  Whether this was due to deficit spending is once 
again difficult to ascertain.  Some argue that deficit spending and constant borrowing 
were necessary to ensure growth, while others argue that growth would have occurred 
nonetheless.  But the second oil crisis of 1979 changed circumstances dramatically.   
This is the point at which it should appear obvious that Ireland was essentially at 
the will of other countries in regard to economic developments.  As Bielenberg and Ryan 
explain, economic expansion took a backseat during this period, in terms of various 
countries’ economic policymaking.  Instead, governments hoped to stem the tide of 
inflation by focusing on stabilizing prices and maintaining high interest rates.  In 
conjunction with these unfriendly international circumstances, the Irish political situation 
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also deteriorated with three different elections being called in 1981 and 1982.  As the 
economic downturn took hold in Ireland, the government did not take any corrective 
measures to ensure economic stability, but instead opted to continue deficit spending.77   
In fact, as the Irish economy entered the 1980s, deficit spending actually 
increased to a high of 7.9 percent of GNP in 1982 and 1983, as compared to only 3.6 
percent in 1977.  Here we can also see the decidedly marked shift undertaken by Fianna 
Fáil with an increase to 6.1 percent deficit in 1978, the year after they took power.78  But 
how are we to interpret budget deficits?  Do they have any real effect on either an 
individual country’s strength or performance? 
It remains a fact that of the three leading economies in the world, two of them (the 
U.S. and Japan) have debts accounting for more than one hundred percent of GDP.  In 
fact, Japan carries the highest debt-to-GDP ratio in the world at over two hundred 
percent.  However, these unfavorable circumstances have done little to affect the strength 
or economic prospects of either country.  Their economic status has not been brought into 
question.  However, in Ireland during the late 70s and early 80s, a mounting debt 
eventually forced the government to institute corrective measures of austerity in order to 
“save face” internationally.  Thus, we can see from the examples of the United States and 
Japan, as well as the historic experience of Ireland, that there is indeed an international 
economic hierarchy in which smaller, less advanced economies are viewed more 
skeptically than historic powerhouses.  Unfortunately for Ireland, it falls in the former 
category.  In turn, smaller countries have to do more to prove themselves to larger trading 
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partners, formulating and maintaining relationships that are highly beneficial for larger 
economies but less favorable for smaller ones. 
During this period, Ireland was also undergoing a domestic reorientation that 
threatened to attract disadvantageous international attention.  As has already been 
discussed, the evolution of the Troubles and political anxieties had already worked to 
throw the nation into a state of concern.  But at the same time, the tenets of “social 
partnership,” as outlined in chapter one, were being undermined by growing agitation in 
the workforce, caused by developments in domestic policy as well as by European 
integration. 
Much of this agitation was born out of the inequitable structures of the Irish tax 
system.  As formulated by the earlier corporatist agenda, the relatively equal burden of 
the income tax system, despite its numerous inadequacies, had worked to alleviate 
conflict.  However, as previously discussed, EEC membership brought with it favorable 
conditions to the agriculture sector not only in guaranteed subsidies and price levels; in 
addition, Irish farmers had long been exempt from paying income taxes.  This, in 
conjunction with a prevailing favorable corporate tax system, escalated the burden on 
those outside those two sectors, resulting in a 50 percent increase on those subjected to 
paying income taxes during the 1970s.79  Additionally, the amount of indirect taxation as 
a percentage of total taxation during this period remained among the highest in the EEC.     
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The unrest caused by this eventually culminated “in a one-day national strike on 
20 March in 1979 with 150,000 protesters in Dublin and another 40,000 in Cork.”80  In a 
memorandum presented before the Irish Transport and General Workers Union 
(ITGWU), the massive inequalities and inefficiencies in the Irish tax code were brought 
to light by P. Sweeney: “the PAYE sector, which made up two-thirds of those at work, 
were paying 90 percent of all income tax.”81  Sweeney went on to assert: “The essential 
point is that the tax base is too narrow in Ireland, and that the burden falls too heavily on 
one sector with relatively low incomes.”82  In contrast, the ITGWU memorandum noted 
that during the late 1970s and early 1980s, “Governments continued to impose more and 
more tax on the PAYE sector, while at the same time reducing taxes on capital.”83  This 
was accomplished through maintaining low taxes on corporate profits, the abolition of the 
wealth tax, the replacement of duties, and a decrease in capital gains taxes. 
In terms of the corporate tax structure, it was during this period that Ireland began 
to be utilized by MNCs (multinational corporations) as a tax shelter, as well as a platform 
to the European market.  This was especially evident in regards to the development of 
foreign-owned companies operating in Ireland.  In a report commissioned by the National 
Economic and Social Council (NESC) in 1980 and published in 1982, known as the 
Telesis report, the disparity between the progress of foreign-owned firms and the relative 
stagnation of Irish-owned industry became apparent.  In the report, the NESC noted that, 
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“Currently, most foreign-owned companies use Ireland as a convenient manufacturing 
satellite for sales in the EEC.” 84 Though the report noted that foreign-owned industry 
helped add roughly 22,000 jobs to the Irish economy between 1973 and 1980, the NESC 
also highlighted the fact that foreign-owned companies did not demonstrate a real interest 
in the overall well-being of the Irish economy but rather an inherent self-interest.  The 
report states: “Foreign-owned industrial operations in Ireland with few exceptions do not 
embody the key competitive activities of the businesses in which they participate; do not 
employ significant number of skilled workers; and are not significantly integrated into 
traded and skilled sub-supply industries in Ireland.”85 
Contrarily, the NESC report also exposed the declining position of indigenous-
owned industry, noting that Irish ownership “represented two-thirds of total 
manufacturing employment in 1980, down from three-quarters in 1973.”  Additionally, 
the orientation of this sector did not fall into the government’s broad strategy of export-
orientation.  The report notes that Irish businesses “represent only 30% of total Irish 
exports in manufactured goods.”86 The NESC also observed that, “Statements on Irish 
industrial strategy have emphasized indigenous resource and manufacturing based 
industry.  Government resources committed and actually spent do not reflect this goal.”87  
Compounding these matters was a shift in bargaining power that had developed 
during the 1970s.  Towards the latter half of the decade, the Irish government undertook a 
more interventionist role in labor relations.  In 1979, bargaining between labor and 
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employers, mediated by the state, resulted in the drafting of “The National Understanding 
for Economic and Social Development,” which looked to reinstitute the previous 
precedent of wage restraint in return for increased public servicing of health, education, 
and employment.88   
But even as these aspects of labor’s grievances were being attended to, 
unemployment was still increasing, as it went over the 100,000 mark in July of 1980.  
These factors led to the eventual resignation of Jack Lynch as head of Fianna Fáil, and 
brought into power one of Ireland’s most fascinating and controversial political figures, 
Charles Haughey.  When Haughey’s became Taoiseach in late 1979, he recognized that 
one of the more pressing concerns for the Irish economy was fiscal rectitude.  While this 
was undoubtedly the case, the way in which the Haughey government approached this 
proved to be one of the more detrimental experiences in government directed economic 
policy.  In an unstable economic environment, Haughey hoped to encourage domestic 
production and consumption through the Industrial Development Authority by 
formulating new subsidies for industry and agriculture, while also maintaining existing 
appropriations.  Additionally, he hoped to encourage a reinvigoration of the domestic 
economy with his “buy Irish” campaign, which ultimately proved ineffective.  While 
Haughey’s measures did very little to stimulate domestic growth, they do represent one of 
the few times in which the government looked inward towards domestic driven growth, 
since its volte-face of the late 50s and early 60s.89 
Haughey’s most drastic misstep was in how he paid for his attempts to stimulate 
economic growth.  Increased borrowing to service both the debt and needs of public 
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funding worked once again to relegate Ireland to dependent status.  By 1979, 27 percent 
of state revenues was appropriated to servicing the nation’s debt, and since deficit 
spending continued to increase during the 1980s, this percentage assuredly increased as 
well.90   
But even as deficit spending increased, unemployment also continued to increase, 
reaching 12 percent in 1981.  In the general elections of 1981, Fianna Fáil was not only 
kicked out of office by the Irish electorate because of the continuing economic malaise, 
but more notably for its drastic change in economic policy that placed an emphasis on 
restoring the nation’s finances, no matter the cost.  Once again this would usher in a new 
era in Ireland’s economic development, as the government looked to institute austere 
measures in order to eliminate deficits and lessen Ireland’s fiscal debt.  In setting out to 
accomplish these goals, the government ignored the primary recommendation of the 
NESC report: “Perhaps the greatest need for Ireland’s industrial policy in the 1980’s is to 
better manage the development of indigenous industry.”91 
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V. Milton Friedman Comes to Ireland 
As a new era of political fragmentation began in Ireland during the early 1980s, 
Irish economic structures underwent a fascinating period of stagnation and malaise.  
Beginning in 1981, the political prospects of Fianna Fáil were in flux.  The fate of their 
government lay in its adoption of a new economic policy geared towards austerity.  This 
program was spearheaded by Ray MacSharry, Minister of Finance at the time.  In 
response to a massive rise in foreign debt, MacSharry suspended automatic raises in 
public sector pay and instituted spending cuts across the board.  However, though this 
program could be seen as pragmatic in terms of stabilizing the country’s finances, the 
political and socioeconomic consequences were dramatic.   
The 1980s saw the emergence of a new theoretical consensus based around 
classical economic liberalism.  The rise of this new dominant ideology was based around 
two newly developed economic theories: New Classical Macroeconomics (NCM) and the 
Efficient Markets Hypothesis (EMH).  New Classical Macroeconomics was developed by 
Milton Friedman in the 1970s and eventually became the dominant ideology in university 
curriculum.  Broadly speaking, NCM advocated for reduced deficits and debt, maintain 
low rates of inflation, and placing restrictions on formulating budgets.  The Efficient 
Markets Hypothesis, considered the “ideological soul mate of NCM,” was developed by 
Eugene Fama, another economist based at the University of Chicago.  Generally, EMH 
embraced the inherent efficiency of financial markets, and argued that markets were self-
regulating and needed little, if any, independent regulation.92 
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These two theories in conjunction with one another resulted in a reorientation of 
macroeconomic orthodoxy.  The results of this new consensus were quite profound. One 
of the primary modifications within this model was a smaller emphasis placed on 
unemployment and economic growth, and more focus placed on maintaining stable levels 
of inflation.  Furthermore, this new economic philosophy stressed an adherence to 
supply-side polices, rather than the Keynesian approach of demand management.  This 
would be facilitated by an environment in which regulation was either greatly diminished 
or dismantled.  Maintaining minimal levels of debts and controlling deficit spending 
placed an emphasis on controlling a nation’s public finances at almost any cost.  As is 
evident in the case of the Irish economy during the 1980s, this new ideology would 
greatly influence how Irish policymakers sought to deal with emerging problems in the 
Irish economy.  However, this new ideology would greatly inhibit economic development 
in a small, open economy like Ireland’s.93 
In the early 1980s, various political factions on the left ceased support for Fianna 
Fáil, and as a result in 1981 a new coalition led by Garrett Fitzgerald and Fine Gael took 
control of the government.  The coalition also included the Labour Party, which had 
increased its seats in the Dáil to sixteen.  In terms of economic policy, Alan Dukes took 
control of the Finance ministry and essentially carried on MacSharry’s program of 
“economic realism.”  His view was that the primary goal of the government should be “to 
cut the budget deficit by the maximum amount possible, almost regardless of the political 
consequences.” But unfortunately for Fine Gael, and especially for Labour, the political 
consequences would be drastic.94 
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Beginning with the budget of 1983, the Fitzgerald government instituted a series 
of draconian cuts to public spending, as well as increases in taxation.  While this did 
accomplish its goal of eliminating budget deficits and decreasing the nation’s public debt, 
these drastic cuts also had an immense effect on Irish society.  In this period, borrowing 
decreased from a high of 21 percent of GNP in 1982, to just 1.5 percent in 1989.  
Additionally, inflation rates, which policymakers had continuously labored to control, 
were reduced from 17 percent to 4 percent over the same period.  The consequences of 
these developments were very harsh.  In the same period, income per head (after taxes) 
dropped twelve percent, and emigration averaged 25,000 per year.  As a result of the 
lower standards of living produced by these austerity measures, in the 1986 election the  
Labour party’s support dropped to its lowest level since de Valera had first become 
Taoiseach back in 1932.  In conjunction, Fine Gael’s representation dropped from 
seventy seats in the Dáil to fifty-one.  Additionally, at this point the political left had 
become greatly fragmented in Ireland, while Fianna Fáil represented itself as a centrist 
party, committed to promoting pro-growth policies.  In 1987, Fianna Fáil returned to 
power, with Haughey once again as Taoiseach.95 
In order to understand the evolving political situation, we must explore further the 
perplexing dimensions of the Irish economy during this period.  As previously stated, 
drastic austerity measures were instituted.  The consequences of these should be obvious 
to most.  However, there are other aspects of the economy to consider if we are to gain a 
better understanding of why this period is one of the more disconcerting eras in Ireland’s 
economic development.   
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As draconian cuts were being implemented by the Fitzgerald government, the 
power of the state to regulate and institute control over the economy seemed evident.  
However, this presents somewhat of a paradox if we are to view Ireland through the lens 
of larger economic structures.  Furthermore, the counterintuitive nature of policymaking 
during this period suggests that it was not government policy that allowed the economy to 
recover toward the end of the decade.  Consequently, it will be shown that larger 
international developments, beginning in 1987, were actually responsible for 
precipitating economic recovery and providing the immediate impetus for the rise of the 
Celtic Tiger. 
As previously stated, the Irish economy lagged during most of the 1980s.  
However, if we look closer at growth, output, and employment, we are presented with 
somewhat of a paradox, as industrial output during the period actually grew while 
unemployment continued to remain at high levels, breaking down the perceived 
relationship between economic growth and employment.  At the same time, we also see a 
marked rise in FDI from the United States, from 986 million pounds in 1977 to 3.8 billion 
in 1983.  So why was this period characterized by stagnation?96 
The answer to this question lies in real income per head, various consumer 
metrics, and the rise of economic liberalism as the dominant ideological framework for 
economic policymaking.  John Kurt Jacobsen has identified that the twin goals of the 
political and economic discourse of the period were to “restore order to the public 
finances” and to “create the right climate for investment.”97  Thus, in order to promote an 
image of fiscal responsibility, massive spending cuts and tax increases were instituted.  
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As discussed in the previous chapter, this fiscal policy actually worked against both the 
neoliberal and Keynesian models.  All this policy would achieve would be to “get the 
fiscal house in order,” while doing little to stimulate economic growth or employment 
through either public or private investment.  Furthermore, spending cuts and tax increases 
worked in conjunction to actually discourage demand, and in turn encourage sluggishness 
in the economy.  Between 1980 and 1985, domestic demand fell by 11 percent, while 
domestic investment also fell by 2 percent. 
Thus, while we can see a growth in output, but a decline or stagnation in real 
incomes, the only logical reason for these developments is a different program being 
introduced by the business sector.  In fact, Jacobsen sees this turn of events as marking 
the point when Irish business became more concerned with wealth creation than 
employment.98  Undoubtedly, this fostered a more antagonistic relationship between labor 
and business.  However, with little economic means through which to exercise bargaining 
power, labor had little choice except to tolerate the extenuating circumstances of the time.  
To complicate matters for trade unions, the partner they thought they were putting into 
power with the ascension of the Fine Gael-Labour coalition government, was actually 
more hostile toward their grievances than previously recognized.  This was manifested in 
a quote taken from a Fine Gael representative stating, “social partners have no right to 
decide economic and social policy.”99  If this is the case, then why institute social 
partnership at all?  It could be suggested that social partnership was simply a façade to 
alleviate labor concerns, while promoting a friendly business environment to potential 
international investors. 
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While these aspects were detrimental to the Irish economy, the coalition 
government did accomplish Alan Dukes’ goal of getting the nation’s public finances 
under control.  But the political consequences for the coalition government were dire.  
The 1987 election saw the return to power of Fianna Fáil and Charlie Haughey.  With 
rising unemployment and a decline in social partnership, Irish trade unions backed 
Haughey and his government, and were incorporated into a new partnership scheme that 
called for modest wage increases over a three-year period in exchange for cuts in public 
spending, amounting to 485 million pounds.100  
With a more active partner in the government, it appeared a new era in labor 
relations was on the horizon in Ireland.  However, while Haughey’s initial efforts to work 
productively with labor might be interpreted as a major alteration in Ireland’s economic 
makeup, it is actually more accurate to characterize Fianna Fáil’s transition to power as 
one of continuity rather than interruption.  This is manifested in the Tallaght Strategy, 
which was introduced by the major political parties shortly after Fianna Fáil came to 
power.  This development was born out of the programme instituted by returning 
Minister of Finance, Ray MacSharry.  His fiscal policy, which continued Fine Gael’s 
fiscal approach of slashing public expenditures, so impressed the outgoing Alan Dukes, 
now leader of Fine Gael, that Dukes committed his party to not opposing the new 
government so long as it continued to enact a contractionary fiscal policy.  Essentially, 
this conceived a broad ideological consensus that not only worked to cement Fianna 
Fáil’s political power, but also virtually excluded the only viable leftist political parties: 
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Labour and the Worker’s Party.101  Most importantly, the Tallaght Strategy 
disempowered the Irish electorate by giving voters no viable political alternative to 
challenge the Irish political élite. 
Shortly after MacSharry enacted his cuts (amounting to roughly 900 million 
pounds between 1987 and 1989), the Irish economy actually began to recover from 
previous economic stagnation.  Many contemporaries attributed this upturn to the 
economic shock therapy implemented by Finance, resulting in the laudatory celebration 
of the policy of expansionary fiscal contraction.102  However, to ascribe the recovery of 
the Irish economy to fiscal policy mechanisms and a slash in public expenditure would be 
somewhat misleading. 
To explain the causes of economic recovery, Patrick Honohan has put forth 
competing frameworks to help explain both why the economy experienced recovery and 
why reform was delayed.  The first of these is the “institutional hypothesis” theory, which 
broadly puts forth that government policymaking was to blame for Ireland’s economic 
malaise in the 1980s.  This hypothesis works in the sense that government action in the 
form of spending cuts and tax increases did little to stimulate demand and a reasonable 
domestic economy, and Honohan also maintains that the continuity in economic policy 
between the coalition and Fianna Fáil governments demonstrates that this theory could 
not fully explain the Irish economy’s rebirth.103 
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Another of these hypotheses is the “external conditions and changing sacrifice 
ratio” theory.  This hypothesis relies on “shifting external factors to explain the timing of 
adjustment.”104  Honohan explains that the British recession occurring during the same 
period reduced the demand for Irish exports.  Since Britain was Ireland’s largest trading 
partner, any decrease in British demand would have a significant impact on the Irish 
economy.  
Additionally, Honohan explains how fiscal policy was antithetical to both 
recession and recovery, stating that, “fiscal retrenchment was procyclical in the early 
unsuccessful phase, and anticyclical in the later successful phase.”105  Thus we can 
overturn the assumption that activist government policy was the reason behind either 
recession or recovery.  Instead, we have to assert the primacy of international 
circumstances in provoking both growth and decline.  It is evident from this period in 
Ireland’s economic history that this is the case.106 
By 1987, the economy was slowly recouping the losses it had seen in the previous 
years. Budget deficits were eliminated in 1987, and a surplus was even recorded in the 
following year.  More importantly, however, international conditions were also 
improving.  Honohan states, “the UK boom sucked in migrants from Ireland, lowering 
the unemployment rate at home.”107  Moreover, as the Irish economy was being 
bolstered, new developments in the EEC were also materializing.  These would have 
tremendous implications for the rise of the Celtic Tiger in proceeding years. 
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As the EEC began to develop on a more institutional basis, those steering the 
organization sought a way to integrate member countries to an even fuller extent.  This 
culminated in the Single European Act in 1987.  What this proposed was a greater 
reduction of national sovereignty in order to create a more efficient system in which there 
would be “free movement of capital and labor, as well as goods and services.”108  More 
specifically, the Single European Act entailed the relaxation of border controls, 
agreement on technical standards, and the liberalization of the finance and service 
sectors.  All of this taken together would allegedly ensure a more efficient system based 
on competition, a decrease in costs of production, and, consequentially, increased 
production.  All of these aspects of this program fit onto a wider supply-side oriented 
framework. 
The establishment of the Single European Act had an immense impact on the Irish 
economy.  Various studies have shown that the foundations of the Single European Act 
actually had more significant consequences for Ireland and other peripheral countries 
than for the core countries of the EEC.  Particularly for Ireland, the opening of the 
European market would enormously encourage FDI inflows, especially from the United 
States.  A quantitative analysis of this will be developed in the following chapter.  But in 
order to stay competitive in a more open European economy, Ireland had to develop a 
system of wage rates that would remain attractive to foreign MNCs.109 
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John Key Jacobsen has labeled this as one of “the ironies of chasing progress.”110  
He goes on to propose, “Elites inform job holders that in order to catch up with EEC 
living standards they must lag behind the rates of wage (and by extension, social wage) 
growth among trading partners.”111  This suggests a hypocritical paradox in which wage 
earners are forced to remain near the bottom of European living standards in order to 
facilitate wealth creation.  This aspect will also be explored in following chapters, in an 
analysis of increasing levels of income inequality.   
It is evident that further liberalization in integration and trade generated both costs 
and benefits to the Irish economy.  Though the Single European Act is unquestionably 
the most important development in terms of Ireland’s recovery and subsequent progress 
in the late 1980s, another development within the European community also aided 
Ireland’s efforts to rebound from earlier economic recession.  The increase in the 
availability of European Structural Funds had both short and long-term effects.  In the 
short term, these funds were allocated to infrastructure projects, as well as assisting 
investment and innovation in the private sector by reducing the costs of capital.  In terms 
of long-term progression, funds were directed toward human resource development in the 
form of training and education.  This is perhaps more relevant in the case of Ireland as its 
relatively highly educated workforce was a considerable contribution to its attractiveness 
for FDI.  In turn, Barry, Bradley, and Hannan argue that the increase in FDI from the 
effects of human resource development also raised the demand for unskilled labor.  
Though this may be true, the development of a more integrated Europe would mitigate 
these effects, as a more liberal movement of labor, as well as wage competitiveness, 
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would either result in allocating investment to countries that have lower labor costs or 
force wage levels to remain comparatively low.  Growing income inequality in Ireland in 
the 1980s and 90s demonstrates that the latter is a valid argument.112 
So while Ireland was experiencing a more stable and prosperous economy 
entering the 1990s, there were inherent weaknesses in the economic structure that would 
persist until the eventual collapse of the Celtic Tiger in 2008.  However, this does not 
give a full picture if we are to understand Ireland’s economic growth during the 1990s.  
Furthermore, these weaknesses did not ultimately come to fruition until Ireland’s boom 
was in full swing.  To understand the growth of the Celtic Tiger, it is vital to analyze how 
the various policy mechanisms from both the government and the EU were put into 
operation, and what actual effect they had on the nation in terms of both economic and 
social conditions. 
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VI. The Celtic Tiger Years: 1987-2002 
 The years that witnessed the rise of the Celtic Tiger are of great fascination to 
historians and economists alike.  It was not just the fact that the Irish economy 
experienced high levels of growth, but also that this growth happened with such velocity.  
Donovan and Murphy in their book, The Fall of the Celtic Tiger, have highlighted a 
profound shift in the public and media perception of Ireland in just ten short years by 
noting two articles published in The Economist.  The first of these was published in 1988 
under the title “Poorest of the Rich,” and explored how Ireland was easily the most 
meager of the relatively well-off countries of northwest Europe.  The authors then 
highlight a cover story on the Irish economy published by The Economist in 1997 under 
the heading “Europe’s shining light,” which explored Ireland’s high and sustained growth 
patterns and prosperous future prospects.113 
 Undoubtedly the Irish economy underwent a dramatic transformation during this 
period, characterized by massive exports, rising levels in GDP, and sensational financial 
innovation.  But how was this achieved?  Previous chapters have explored how since the 
late 1950s the foundations for economic growth were put into place.  Though the 
economy sustained levels of growth that had not been experienced prior to the 
liberalization of the 1960s, subsequent fluctuations in both the world economy and 
problems in policymaking inhibited sustained growth for Ireland’s small and open 
economy.  However, as will be shown, the late 1980s and early 1990s presented the great 
opportunity Irish leaders had been looking for.  Though Ireland’s path toward progress 
and prosperity had been long and arduous, the period of the Celtic Tiger brought Ireland 
                                                        
113 Donovan and Murphy, The Fall of the Celtic Tiger, 15. 
 
  
64 
to the forefront of the global economy, as international structures began to shift and 
Ireland moved from the economic periphery to the world’s economic core. 
 The term “Celtic Tiger” was minted in 1994 by Kevin Gardiner, an economist 
working for Morgan Stanley.  However, the principles underlying the rise of the Irish 
economy were put into place and practice years before this.  With the creation of the 
Single European Act in 1987, the groundwork for a drastic shift in the world economy 
was put into place.  Five years later, in 1992, Ireland signed the Maastricht Treaty, 
officially entering into the Single European Market.  This is what would cement Ireland’s 
economic status for the next fifteen years.  Though Ireland was already positioned, and in 
fact being utilized, for American access to the European market, this marked the point at 
which American FDI grew at an astounding rate.114 
 But this only explains one side of the shift in international economic structures.  
Donovan and Murphy explain how the advent of the American high-tech revolution in 
the early 1990s allowed Ireland to build upon its existing foreign industrial sector.  As 
high-tech firms flocked toward Ireland for a platform to the European market, other 
MNCs followed suit. 
 What should be obvious here is what Donovan and Murphy term “the coming 
together of two economic tectonic plates, those of the United States and the European 
Union.”115  This is what allowed Ireland to move from the economic periphery to the 
global financial core.  They further assert, “Without Ireland intermediating the high-tech 
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revolution between Silicon Valley and Europe, it is quite likely that there would have 
been no ‘Celtic Tiger.’”116 
 However, the ambiguities of the Irish economic boom are much more complicated 
and interrelated than merely a shift in international structures.  Though this is what 
precipitated the rise of the Celtic Tiger, the impact on the economy was more than just an 
experience of high growth patterns and a massive increase in exports.  To find how this 
shift affected Ireland on a more domestic level, it is necessary to explore the 
consequences these profound developments had on sectoral distribution, labor and 
employment, and most importantly, the disparity between foreign and domestic 
ownership.  These taken together will help explain why the economy grew with such 
exuberance, but also how it crumbled so swiftly. 
 In terms of economic growth, the prosperity Ireland enjoyed during the 1990s and 
early 2000s was the highest in the nation’s history.  Looking at this period broadly, 
between 1987 and 1997 Irish GNP grew by 70 percent.  In comparison, the US economy 
grew 27 percent, Great Britain 20 percent, and the EU 24 percent during the same period.  
GNP per head grew from 59 percent of the EU average in 1987 to 88 percent in 1997.117  
In terms of employment, during the same ten-year span 23 percent more jobs were added 
to the economy.  Furthermore, real wages during this period grew 22 percent.  Along with 
this, indices show an increase of roughly 20 percent in productivity per employee.118  
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A closer examination of sectoral distribution reveals not only how the economy 
grew at an extraordinary rate, but also how the economic composition in Ireland shifted 
toward service sector domination, a marker of a newly industrialized country.  Though 
employment had increased during each year since 1989, this increase was experienced at 
various levels depending on sector orientation.  For instance, agriculture experienced a 
loss of 29,000 jobs (or roughly 18 down percent from its 1989 levels) in the eight years 
leading up to 1997.  By contrast, the market services sector underwent a dramatic rise in 
sectoral employment, which amounted to a 37 percent increase, or a net gain of 165,000 
jobs.  Of the almost 250,000 jobs created as a whole by the economy during this period, 
market services accounted for nearly two-thirds.  Both industry and the non-market 
services sector experienced growth in employment figures but on a substantially smaller 
scale than the market-oriented sector.  In terms of accounting for how these various 
sectors contributed to the overall economic growth, agriculture is the outlier in this 
regard, as both employment and productivity decreased.119 
 
Sectoral Employment and Percentage Change 
 1989 1997 % job change 
Agriculture 163,200 134,200 -18 
Industry 306,400 386,400 +26 
Market services 442,000 607,100 +37 
Non-market services 178,300 210,700 +18 
Total Employment 1,089,900 1,338,400 +23 
  
Source: Barry, Hannan, and Stroble, “The Real Convergence,” 20. 
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Looking at market services more specifically, the highest growth in this sector can 
be seen in insurance, finance, and business services, as well as in the “other” category, 
which includes both tourism and international financial services.  These two, taken in 
conjunction with one another, contributed over 120,000 new jobs to the economy.  This 
could only suggest that the economy itself during this period was being reoriented to 
promote an environment favorable to corporate interests, in terms of various business and 
financial services serving the needs of the growing numbers of MNCs setting up bases in 
Ireland.  What is needed next is an examination of the influx of foreign investment and 
corporations to Ireland, and how this also contributed to the reorientation of the Irish 
economy to one more fixated on international circumstances than the needs of its own 
domestic market.120 
 With Ireland entering the Single European Market in 1992, FDI escalated at a 
rapid pace.  Though American companies had been attracted to Ireland in previous 
periods, due primarily to its corporate-friendly tax structure, the opportunity Ireland 
presented as a European platform was too enticing for foreign corporations to pass up.  
However, it is interesting to note that there was actually a delay between when 
investment was made in Ireland and when actual growth was experienced in the 
economy.  The efforts of the Industrial Development Authority (IDA) in attracting 
emerging sectors in the economy to invest in Ireland cannot be overlooked.  Though this 
process had begun in the 1970s and 1980s, the IDA had the foresight to target investment 
in high-tech industry, such as computers, pharmaceuticals, and telecommunications.  
This, coupled with the emergence of the high-tech revolution, fostered the perfect 
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environment for MNCs to erect operations in Ireland.  Consequently, between 1991 and 
1993, American investment in Ireland tripled.121 
 In comparison to other European countries, the massive influx of human and 
financial capital to Ireland was quite extraordinary.  Paul Krugman calculated in 1997 
that American investment in Ireland was six times higher per capita than in France and 
Germany, and five times more per capita than in Britain.  The latter of these comparisons 
is more remarkable in that the British economy was the only other predominantly 
English-speaking member of the European Union.  This differentiation derives from 
Ireland being much more committed to the process of full European integration than was 
Great Britain, evidenced in the fact that British politicians refused to enter into the 
European Monetary Union and maintained its adherence to sterling.122 
The composition of the influx of FDI from MNCs should be noted.  Companies in 
high-tech sectors made up the bulk of this investment, including “companies such as 
Apple, Boston Scientific, Coca Cola, 3 Com, Dell, Gateway, IBM, Hewlett Packard, 
Microsoft, Motorola, Northern Telecom, Pepsi, Pfizer…”123 By 1993, output in the five 
sectors that accounted for the lion’s share of MNC investment (computers, software, 
chemicals, pharmaceuticals, and cola concentrates) amounted to 43 percent of Ireland’s 
total manufacturing production.  In 1996, this rose to 53 percent.  As the successes of 
these various MNCs became undeniable, others followed suit in constructing a base of 
operations in Ireland. 
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It should be apparent that much of the growth experienced during this period can 
be attributed to the massive inundation of foreign capital.  However, at a domestic level, 
Irish policymakers were doing well in making sure prospects for the continuance of 
economic expansion were not inhibited by government policies.  Even as domestic 
government investment nominally increased, policymakers were still able to maintain a 
constant balance in the country’s finances. The reinvigoration of the corporatist model of 
social partnership (or at least the appearance thereof) was vital to presenting Ireland as a 
good place to do business, as it was in previous decades.  However, as will be seen in the 
next chapter, the fragility of this partnership, and its inherent contradictions, would 
ultimately be a contributing factor to the demise of Ireland’s economic growth. 
But for all the previously mentioned initiatives enacted by domestic policymakers 
to ensure the perpetuation of economic prosperity, where the domestic policy failed was 
in its inability to develop and intensify a functioning and dynamic domestic base.  What 
will be argued here, is that during the first phase of the Celtic Tiger, the Irish economy 
transformed into a two-tier system, dominated by the foreign-owned sector of the 
economy, while the domestically-owned sphere of the Irish economy lagged behind in 
both growth and real production. 
The disparity between foreign and domestic owned industry became much more 
revealing during the period of the Celtic Tiger.  Firstly, the historically dominant role of 
agriculture was essentially erased during this period.  As one of the more domestic 
oriented sectors of the Irish economy, the decline in agricultural employment and 
production presents just one facet of the development of this dichotomy. 
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On a more profound and consequential level, the emerging market-services 
industry gives us a perfect model in which to view this problem.  In the financial services 
sector alone, there was a dramatic increase in terms of employment in foreign-owned 
firms.  In 1989, 5,586 workers were employed in foreign-owned financial services firms.  
This increased by almost 20,000 in the next eight years, resulting in an employee 
percentage growth of 254 percent.  Though domestic-owned employment also grew in 
this sector, from 4,113 in 1989 to 9,790 employees in 1997, both real employment 
numbers and percentage growth were roughly less than half of that experienced in 
foreign-owned firms during the same period.124 
To supplement these figures, manufacturing employment also followed this 
pattern.  In the same time period, employment in indigenous manufacturing grew by only 
8 percent, while employment in the foreign-owned sector rose 24 percent.  These 
numbers are even more dramatic when we consider the five sectors previously mentioned 
as comprising the bulk of MNC investment.  Both pharmaceuticals and chemicals 
experienced percentage growth twenty points higher in foreign-owned industry as 
compared to domestic-owned.  In an even starker contrast, the office and data processing 
sector of the new high-tech economy enjoyed a 181 percent growth in foreign-owned 
employment, compared to just 21 percent in indigenous owned firms.125   
In contrast to the growth in high-tech manufacturing and market services, the 
sectors that lagged behind were those that had previously been characterized by 
indigenous proprietorship.  Barry, Hannan, and Strobl note that, “The sectors in which 
both groups shed jobs consisted of largely non-tradeable sectors – non-metallic minerals 
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and drink and tobacco – and two easily entered low-wage sectors: textiles, and clothing 
and footwear.”126 
Apart from the fact that growth was being experienced most acutely and rapidly 
in the foreign dominated sectors, government policy, especially in the form of the tax 
system and other financial mechanisms, greatly favored the expansion of foreign industry 
and investment.   As previously noted, the corporate tax structure in Ireland was 
extremely friendly toward MNCs and foreign investment.  By this point, the government 
had actually “raised” corporate taxes to 12.5 percent of manufactured exports.  However, 
Donovan and Murphy highlight that there were other advantages to MNCs doing business 
in Ireland, including “capital grants, generous investment depreciation allowances and tax 
exemptions pertaining to research and development activities.”127  While these were 
available to both foreign and indigenous firms, the benefits of this system were enjoyed 
predominantly by the vastly larger multinationals. 
One of the mechanisms within this system that requires further explanation is 
transfer pricing.  Transfer pricing allows corporations to reallocate profits to branches in 
the corporation that are located in nations where profit taxation is more favorable, 
essentially creating a device in which corporate tax avoidance becomes legitimate.  What 
this allows is companies to generate profits in other areas around the globe, while 
maintaining that their predominant base of operations is in Ireland, thus allowing them to 
take advantage of Ireland’s low corporate tax rates.  The ethical practice of this method of 
profit reallocation is ambivalent.  Hypothetically, MNCs could set up a building or base 
of operations with a small number of employees and claim that this represents their 
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corporate headquarters.  Thus, while doing little to stimulate growth or employment in 
Ireland, corporations are able to take advantage with no risk and little cost.  This 
mechanism obviously presents us with another example in the disparity between foreign 
and domestic owned companies, and also exemplifies the opportunity gap that persisted 
in this two-tier system.128 
The evidence of disparities between the foreign and domestic elements of the 
economy is somewhat difficult to elucidate, particularly in the form of transfer pricing 
and repatriation of profits.  However, one measure through which we can expose this 
divergence is comparing GDP and GNP measurements in the economy.  GNP excludes 
both foreign debt interest payments and capital that has been removed from the domestic 
economy, and thus “provides a better measure of the income earned by Irish capital and 
labor.”129  The discrepancy between the two can be seen in the fact that in 1999, GNP 
was actually 15 percent lower than GDP.  When examining this in monetary terms, GNP 
was measured at 75.975 billion euros, and GDP at 87.371 billion euros - a gap of almost 
12 billion euros. 
Another framework through which to view this system is presented by Donovan 
and Murphy.  In their model, a series of concentric circles is used to demonstrate four 
interrelated facets of the economy that they say were the most important to the Irish 
boom.  At the center of the circles, we see the MNCs, which they assert lay at the core of 
economic growth.  Moving out to the second circle is the services sector.  Donovan and 
Murphy maintain that the growth of the services sector (including banking, law, and 
accounting, hotels and restaurants, and transportation) spawned from the needs of the 
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MNCs and the subsequent influx of both capital and employment.  Radiating from this is 
the circle for construction, which served the “demand for property in the form of 
factories, offices, houses and apartments” that logically followed this period of growth.  
Finally, the last of these circles deals with fiscal revenue.  With levels of prosperity 
continuing into the 2000, the government was actually able to “increase expenditure 
while simultaneously lowering tax rates.”  Because of this, domestic consumption and 
real incomes grew during the period.  Donovan and Murphy propose that the result of all 
these factors in conjunction with one another amounted to “what many believed was the 
start of an eternal golden age.”130 
 
                   Fiscal Revenues                                                                                                                  
                                                                                Construction 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                     
                                                                                    Services  
 
 
But this “golden age” did not persist.  With the bursting of the American tech 
bubble in the early 2000s, many of the computer, software, and other technical companies 
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began to curtail investment in Ireland.  As corporate activity in the Irish economy was 
comparatively reduced during the early 2000s, export-led growth in Ireland plummeted.  
To make up for this, the economy shifted from export-orientation to a system propelled 
by domestic demand.  The primary mechanism that spurred this demand was in the 
construction sector.  As property prices skyrocketed, both investment and demand geared 
for this sector.131  But as will be shown, the boom in construction was actually a bubble 
waiting to burst.  Unfortunately for Ireland, by the time the property market had come to 
the brink of collapse, it was so integrated with the rest of the Irish economy that it 
threatened to bring down the entire system. And it did. 
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VII. Short and Long Term Deficiencies 
“Success breeds a disregard of the possibility of failure; the absence of serious financial 
difficulties over a substantial period leads to the development of a euphoric economy in which 
increasing short-term financing of long positions becomes a normal way of life” 
         
        Hyman Linsky132 
 
 When the Celtic Tiger collapsed in the Fall of 2008, the Irish economy was sent 
into a downfall as remarkable as its rise.  However, the demise of the Irish economy was 
not an isolated event, but rather one case within the larger economic collapse that 
precipitated what has come to be known as the Great Recession.  The example of the 
Irish economy in this circumstance can be viewed in a variety of ways.  In the short term, 
the Celtic Tiger during the mid to late 2000s was becoming less of an autonomous actor 
in the global economy.  Instead, Ireland’s economic structures moved even further toward 
global integration.  By both following examples set by American financial institutions 
and seeking to create wealth predicated on increased financialization, the Celtic Tiger 
would eventually fall under its own weight. 
 On an international level, the decade of the 2000s represented an era in which the 
world’s leading economic thinkers began feeling a sense of ease and confidence.  Even 
after the dot-com bubble reached its peak in 2001, economists and policymakers entered 
into an era of assurance and consensus regarding macroeconomic theory that came to be 
termed as the Great Moderation.  In particular, future Chairman of the Federal Reserve 
Ben Bernanke generally posited that “depressions were a thing of the past and that 
macroeconomics had reached its Golden Age.”133  
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 In this era of economic assurance, economists and financiers sought new ways to 
create wealth for both themselves and their institutions’ shareholders.  This was primarily 
accomplished through new innovations in banking and finance.  After the dot-com bubble 
of the early 2000s, financial institutions became much more advanced and creative in 
devising new profit generating schemes.  Specifically, these institutions focused on the 
emerging property sector that began to expand at a rapid rate during the early and mid 
2000s as a lucrative investment opportunity. 
Specifically, large banks created new securities that permitted unqualified 
homebuyers to purchase properties, and also allowed financial institutions to gain 
substantial profits.  This was mainly accomplished through creating new securities, such 
as collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) and mortgage-backed securities (MBSs).  
Beginning in the early 2000s, large financial institutions began forging partnerships with 
mortgage lenders, both large and small, in order to mitigate risks for lenders and also to 
generate profits.  CDOs were the primary avenue through which this was accomplished.  
Mortgage lenders would loan to sub-prime borrowers and would then sell these 
mortgages to larger financial institutions, in order to reduce their own risk of borrower 
default.  These institutions would then bundle mortgages together in order to create lavish 
securities to sell to various hedge funds, brokerage firms, or other actors in the financial 
market.  While this created profits for both lenders and the big banks, predatory lending 
that was encouraged by financial innovation was predicated on imposing a 
disadvantageous requirement on borrowers.  As time wore on, borrowers became less 
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able to make monthly mortgage payments, and the CDOs that were bought and sold by 
large firms eventually became valueless, causing banks to lose billions of dollars.134 
In combination with CDOs, financial institutions also created derivatives known 
as credit default swaps (CDSs) that ensured small and steady profits.  CDSs worked as a 
form of insurance that institutions sold to other actors in the global market.  As a form of 
leverage, banks sold CDSs as insurance against their positions in CDOs.  The various 
entities they sold these to would hold the insurance certificate and compensate banks with 
regular payments.  However, if any of the CDOs that were insured by the CDSs 
defaulted, banks would have to pay an exorbitant sum to the holder of the CDS as 
compensation.  As CDOs began to default, bank payments to holders of CDSs began to 
grow exponentially, to the point at which it drove some institutions to the verge of 
collapse. 
CDOs and CDSs were inherent deficiencies in the property boom of the 2000s, 
and were encouraged by the self-assured atmosphere of the Great Moderation.  Although 
in Ireland, these two examples of financial innovation were not implemented in real 
terms, the Irish banking sector’s increasing integration into the international banking 
sector (specifically with American banks) exposed the Irish banking system to the 
inherent hazards presented by these new securities and derivatives. 
Similar to American financial institutions, in the early and mid 2000s, Irish banks 
began to turn to the property market as the new center of Irish wealth creation.  The 
impetus for stimulating domestic growth through property development was twofold.  
Because of the dot-com bubble of 2001, computer and software companies (as well as 
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other MNCs in the technology sector), on which Ireland had based its MNC-reliant 
strategy began to gradually withdraw capital and investment away from Ireland.  To 
combat the losses being incurred by this process, policymakers and the banking sector 
began to look inward to fill this gap.  As previously explained, the construction industry 
was the logical successor to fill the void of losses in both jobs and production that would 
follow decreases in MNC investment.  Thus, with encouragement from the government, 
banks and developers worked in conjunction with one another to create a new property 
boom that many believed would continue the economic success established during the 
first phase of the Celtic Tiger.135 
Through massive overseas borrowing, Irish banks created and stimulated a 
property boom that was geared toward both residential and commercial development.  
This was done through exorbitant lending to property developers, as well as an excessive 
amount of loans to prospective homebuyers.  As this process gradually continued, the 
property market created by the increase in construction projects turned into a classic asset 
bubble.  Donovan and Murphy contend that the transition from boom to bubble was 
fueled by overproduction on the part of property developers.  The surplus that was 
created in the property market was being facilitated by overlending from Irish banks, 
which had turned away from practices characterized by astute lending and investment.  
Instead, banks began to ground their methods of generating profits in speculation, which 
had been encouraged by the atmosphere created by the Great Moderation.136 
But even as the situation in the property market began to worsen, policymakers 
took no corrective measures in order to ensure that a crisis would not ensue.  In April 
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2008, just five months before the Irish bank-guarantee on September 29, the Department 
of Finance was confident about Ireland’s economic situation, specifically in regards to 
the housing market, stating: “while a correction to the very strong Irish housing market 
was necessary, the downswing is anticipated to be short-lived.”137  A report released by 
the ESRI (Economic and Social Research Institute) was in fact welcomed by Finance and 
its Minister, Brian Lenihan.  Lenihan, writing in May of 2008, issued a statement in 
which he lauded a positive assessment of Ireland’s medium-term economic prospects 
delivered to him from the ESRI.  In the release, Lenihan unequivocally remarked that, 
“The key message that we can take from the Review is that Ireland’s economy is flexible 
and resilient.  Because of our sound economic and fiscal fundamental factors, our 
economy has the ability to absorb shocks in an efficient manner.”138  Just four months 
later, he was proven wrong. 
So what happened in the months leading up to the Irish financial collapse in 
September of 2008?  Apart from the demise of Ireland’s domestic housing market, the 
Irish banking system began to import international problems.  At the same time that the 
Irish property market began to decay, the same situation was taking place in the United 
States but on a much larger scale.  As foreclosures and mortgage defaults increased at an 
alarming rate, the property market in the U.S. began to crash. In turn, the various forms 
of securities and derivatives predicated on property values eventually became worthless, 
causing the big banks (who had created these forms of financial innovation themselves) 
to lose billions of dollars.  As institutions began losing money on both their holdings of 
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CDOs and their positions in CDSs, the American financial system was on the verge of 
collapse.  With the eventual bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers on September 15, the fear of 
financial contagion had caused international credit markets to freeze. 
The consequences of this for Ireland’s banking system were dire.  Because of the 
Irish banks’ reliance on international borrowing, the freeze on global lending (specifically 
from U.S. banks) was disastrous.  It soon became clear to policymakers and bankers that 
the liquidity positions of the banks (the reserve funds the banks were holding) would not 
be able to deal with a public run on the banks without access to outside capital.  
Specifically, the situation of Anglo-Irish Bank was of concern due to its freefalling share 
prices and worsening liquidity position.  After failing to find a potential partner to either 
merge with Anglo or buy them outright, the government grew more worried.  After days 
of contemplating how to deal with the impending crisis, the government decided to 
provide liquidity to Anglo in the form of publically financed and state-backed financial 
guarantees. 
The bank guarantee that was implemented on September 29, 2008, has proven to 
be one of the most controversial acts of economic policy in Ireland’s history.139  Though 
the main target of the bank guarantee was Anglo-Irish Bank, and its worsening financial 
situation, the government also decided to guarantee the deposit requirements of Ireland’s 
five other major financial institutions: Allied Irish Banks (AIB), Bank of Ireland, 
Educational Building Society, Irish Life and Permanent, and Irish Nationwide Building 
Society (INBS).  This was done not only to provide solvency assurances to the public 
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regarding these five institutions, but also to not draw attention to the specific individual 
weaknesses of Anglo.140   
At the time, what this meant was that the government was insuring roughly €440 
billion in liabilities spread among the six financial institutions.  However, at the time 
policymakers believed the amount of capital that was to eventually be injected into the 
banks would never approach this number.  Though the guarantee was a blanket promise 
for all of the big banks, the focus still remained on Anglo. To sell the guarantee to the 
taxpayers, Lenihan, in a statement made a day after the guarantee decision, lectured the 
public on the systemic importance of Anglo, stating: “Anglo Irish Bank is a major 
financial institution whose viability is of systemic importance to Ireland. Anglo has a 
balance sheet of some €100bn with a substantial deposit base.” Lenihan continued: “the 
Government is committed to making a new start for Anglo, in the best interests of the 
State and the taxpayer.”141  Less than three months later, Anglo was nationalized by the 
Irish government. 
By October of 2010, the amount of lending to Ireland’s aforementioned financial 
institutions from the Central Bank of Ireland amounted to €64 billion, or 40 percent of 
Ireland’s GDP.  The financial consequences of recapitalization would eventually force 
the Irish government to appeal for a bailout of its own from the European Central Bank 
(ECB).  Though the calamity of the bank and government bailouts could be perceived as 
the result of an unavoidable international crisis brought on by structural deficiencies in 
the global financial system, the exceptional nature of the case of Ireland in the Great 
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Recession indicates inherent weaknesses in the Irish economic model that preceded the 
rise and fall of the Celtic Tiger, in addition to this international economic crisis.  In fact, 
these inherent weaknesses can be traced back to the 1950s, and were first recognized by 
Seán Lemass.  In his Programme for Economic Expansion, Lemass astutely noted: “our 
economy is subject to acute fluctuations in external trade, the impact of which falls 
primarily on the liquid external reserves of the commercial banks, affecting their ability 
to extend domestic credit.”142 It seemed little had changed in over fifty years. 
At the domestic level, Keiran Allen has highlighted that the rise of the Celtic 
Tiger actually worked to increase class disparities in Ireland, and created what he calls a 
“discontented majority” comprised of those who were excluded from the benefits of 
Ireland’s economic boom.  However, the word “discontented” is perhaps less appropriate 
to describe this group than “powerless.”   The development of this powerless majority 
derived from their exclusion from Ireland’s economic system and political process that 
occurred prior to the rise of the Celtic Tiger and escalated during it. 
Economically, levels of income inequality in Ireland had been among the highest 
in the Western economic sphere, dating back to the 1970s.  The only other two 
economies that could be compared to Ireland in levels of income inequality, were those 
of the U.S. and Great Britain.  Writing during the height of the Celtic Tiger, Brian Nolan 
and Bertrand Mâitre argued that Ireland’s economic boom presented the Irish government 
with an opportunity to deal with income inequality, stating, “new found prosperity opens 
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up choices.”143  However, as the economy grew during the years of the Celtic Tiger, 
levels of income inequality remained high, and welfare efforts as a percentage of GNP 
decreased.  Furthermore, for the first time since 1960, wages as a percentage of GDP in 
Ireland actually fell below the European average, further disenfranchising Irish 
workers.144 
More importantly, however, the Irish political consensus that was first developed 
with the Tallaght Strategy and strengthened during the economic boom, subjected the 
powerless majority to a subservient position in the political process.  The way in which 
this was accomplished was twofold.  First, the strength of the Irish political 
establishment, and the alliance of Fianna Fáil and Fine Gael, created an atmosphere in 
which the Irish electorate was left without a viable political alternative to check the 
political power of the élite.  Secondly, any viable alternative to the political consensus 
that did begin to emerge was quickly deemed irrelevant and irrational.  During the early 
years of the Celtic Tiger, the élite were quick to dismiss and condemn anyone who 
questioned the positive nature of the Irish economy.  This is particularly true of Irish 
trade unions, which lost a great deal of influence during the Celtic Tiger due to legislation 
aimed at moderating union demands and forcing unions to conform to the state’s various 
economic policy objectives.  But while the creation and development of the powerless 
majority was instrumental in ushering in the Celtic Tiger and ensuring its unquestioned 
supremacy, the advent of Ireland’s economic boom and bust would not have been 
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possible without larger economic forces that were put into place long before the rise of 
the Celtic Tiger. 145 
The processes of European integration and globalization offered many perceived 
benefits to the Irish economy during the latter half of the twentieth century.  Opening 
Ireland’s economy to foreign investment and increasing Ireland’s involvement in global 
trade were thought by many to be the springboard for Ireland’s eventual economic 
ascendance.  However, in the long run these processes proved detrimental to Ireland’s 
economic growth and sustainability. 
Both Europeanization and globalization forced Ireland to rapidly develop into a 
modern economy at an unsustainable rate.  Proponents of delayed convergence theory 
would argue that Ireland’s economic advances in the last half of the 20th century were 
phenomenal, as Ireland’s economy turned to economic modernization as its primary 
objective.  However, the forces of globalization actually caused Ireland to “catch up” to 
Western economies at such an accelerated pace that the domestic economy was not 
allowed to sufficiently mature to a stage at which it could tolerate the vulnerability that 
comes with participation in the international economic system.  Throughout the latter half 
of the twentieth century, Irish policymakers were forced to choose between two divergent 
paths regarding the model of the Irish economy.  The first of these was an economy based 
on sustainable and gradual development with a diverse domestic base, but on the 
periphery of the global economic system.  The second was to enact policies geared 
toward innovative and rapid growth that would ensure Ireland’s place at the core of the 
international system; however, this would leave the Irish economy at the mercy of global 
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markets and vulnerable to international shocks.  At almost every instance, Irish 
policymakers chose the latter path. 
It is clear that macro-level forces largely shaped the direction of the Irish 
economy during the last half of the twentieth century.  This was accomplished not only 
by Irish participation in the global system itself, but also by market influences compelling 
the Irish government to enact policies at various times aimed at integrating the Irish 
economy into the international economic system.  The onslaught of European integration 
and globalization forced the Irish government to either join in these phenomena, or to fall 
even further behind than they had been before.  Though at first integration offered Ireland 
a chance to progress economically, it also created situations in which the economy was 
left weak and vulnerable.  However, in the late 1980s Irish policymakers thought they 
had figured out the global economy.  This opinion was even further cemented by the rise 
of the Celtic Tiger and the era of the Great Moderation, emerging in the 1990s.  With the 
prosperity brought on by Ireland’s economic boom, policymakers were presented an 
opportunity to evolve their economic model to ensure future sustainability.  Instead, the 
Irish élite decided to maintain the status quo in order to not upset a system that was 
perceived to be working so well, and also to further their own benefit.  The opportunity 
presented by the Celtic Tiger was regrettably missed, and this proved unfortunate for all 
of Irish society.  
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Epilogue 
After the bank guarantee of September 2008, the Irish financial system was 
perceived as sufficiently stabilized by both the government and the general public.  There 
was a general feeling that government intervention had ensured that the worst was over 
and that the Irish banks would gradually recover from the financial crisis of 2008.  
However, both the banks and the government failed to recognize the depth of the 
financial sector’s problems.  Share prices of the major banks began again to fall as they 
had before the bailout, and there was a massive withdrawal of liquidity from the banks’ 
deposits.  Not only did this leave the banks in a continuously deteriorating position, but 
the government was also put at risk due to its guarantee of sufficient capitalization for the 
banks. 
By the middle of 2009, it became evident that the initial estimates of the 
financials sector’s losses were grossly underestimated.   The government was required by 
the terms of the bailout to inject capital into the banks, as losses continued to mount.  But 
even more detrimental to the nation’s finances was the loss of revenues that were 
triggered by the international crisis and a massive decline in economic activity. The 
collapse of the property market and the construction sector lay at the center of the fiscal 
crisis that the government was now experiencing.  During the second phase of the Celtic 
Tiger, the government was able to amass revenues due to a new tax system aimed toward 
taxing developers and property-holders.  As property development eventually ceased, and 
values began to plummet, government revenues began to experience a drastic decline.  To 
account for these losses, the Department of Finance enacted expenditure cuts that did 
little to alleviate the Exchequer’s deficit problems, while at the same time moving funds 
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away from social spending and out of consumer’s pockets.  Even as cuts increased, 
Ireland’s debt continued to grow heavily, with deficits accounting for 11.8 percent of 
GDP in 2009 and 11 percent in 2010. 
As the fiscal situation was worsening in Ireland, the concerns of the EU and ECB 
(European Central Banks) regarding the Irish economy began to grow.  Though 
participation in the EU and ECB had been thought to bring some financial security to 
Ireland, the neglect of the EU, and the ECB, and its regulators during the impending 
crisis beginning in the summer of 2008 proved that this was not the case. The ECB and 
its regulators, like Irish officials, did not recognize the depth of the crisis and were 
largely absent during both the crisis itself and the formulation of the bank guarantee.  
However, as the situation began to worsen they took a more involved role to ensure that 
economic instability would not spread to the rest of Europe.  This was first evident in 
their mounting pressure on the Greek government to accept a bailout from the IMF and 
ECB in April of 2010. 
It was around this time that it was becoming conceivable that the Irish 
government would have to follow the precedent of Greece’s bailout.  As the government 
continued to inject capital into the nation’s banks, the cost of international borrowing 
began to increase to 6.7 percent as the credit rating on Ireland’s debt began to plummet.  
On October 1 of 2010, a group of EU officials arrived in Ireland for the first time to 
discuss with Irish policymakers what the plan for the future was.  Over the next two 
months, EU and ECB officials placed mounting pressure on the government and further 
involved themselves with formulating the future strategy of the nation’s financial and 
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fiscal administration.  At the same time, the government was continually assuring the 
public that a bailout was out of the question.  By late November, this proved false. 
On November 19, 2010, the ECB issued an ultimatum to the Irish government: 
Dublin was required to request a bailout or the ECB would withdraw support from the 
government’s continuous attempts to preserve its financial system.  The letter that was 
sent to the Irish government has not been made public.  Two days later, the government 
announced that it would accept financial relief from the EU and IMF, and just a week 
later terms were finalized in providing emergency relief to the Irish government.  The 
situation had finally evolved from a bank bailout to a government bailout, resulting in the 
ultimate loss of Ireland’s economic sovereignty. 
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